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ABSTRACT

This paper, the last in a series of five on the current state of citizen education, forecasts likely societal futures and explores the effectiveness of specific citizen education interventions within varied societal contexts. The content is presented in four parts. The first part summarizes the tasks of citizen education in the preparation of effective citizens and the enfranchisement of citizens. The second part on alternative future contexts discusses the importance of interpretive concepts, the basic long-term modernization trend, the emergence of countertrend forces, tendencies opposing the modernization trend, and a developing vision of a transformed society. The next part discusses four critical issue areas: energy and environment, work and citizen roles, the fundamental role of industrial-economic rationality, and knowledge of values and goals. The last part examines the type and probable efficacy of citizen education interventions in each of the following four cases: extrapolative future: citizen education "going with"; extrapolative future: citizen education opposing; transforming future: citizen education "going with"; and transforming future: citizen education opposing. Several critiques are appended. (EM)

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CITIZEN EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE

by

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FOREWORD

Education for effective and responsible citizenship should not be separated from its societal context. Citizen education and activity should be informed by a vision of alternatives facing society and an appreciation of the long-term consequences of political choice.

In this essay, Willis Harman urges us to stand back from the events of the present and to attempt to understand the forces underlying societal stability and change. Dr. Harman proposes that the concept of industrialization provides a key for interpreting the major developments of our times, and also presents unique problems for the exercise of citizenship. His essay contains an exploration of likely alternative futures to help us understand whether present barriers for citizen activity are likely to lessen or increase. The dominant characteristics of industrialization, nascent signs of transformation to a new "post-industrial" era, and the kinds of citizen activity likely to characterize both futures are discussed.

To examine the educational implications of his essay from a range of perspectives, The U.S. Office of Education (USOE) Citizen Education staff asked for critiques from several persons knowledgeable about future studies and experts in education, political science, global studies, and public policy. Some of their remarks appear as footnotes within the text and each response is reproduced in appendix B. The reviewers question some of the essay's assumptions and statements; we hope that the format helps stimulate dialog about the societal context of citizenship and its relevance to education.

I am grateful to Willis Harman for sharing his vision with us, to Lee Anderson, Ronald Brunner, Kenneth Prewitt, and Betty Reardon for articulate and forthright critiques, and to Clement Bezold for a discussion of futuristic techniques and curriculum needs (which appears in appendix A). Karen Dawson, Ann Maust, Larry Rothstein, and Judy Taggart contributed valuable advice and editorial assistance.

Prepared by the USOE Citizen Education staff, this paper is one in a series designed to help raise issues and provide information about the current state of citizen education. Others in the series include:

Key Concepts of Citizenship: Perspectives and Dilemmas

New Directions in Mass Communications Policy: Implications for Citizen Education and Participation

An Analysis of the Role of the U.S. Office of Education and Other Selected Federal Agencies in Citizen Education

The Role of the Workplace in Citizen Education

Citizen Education Today: Developing Civic Competencies

Citizen Participation: Building a Constituency for Public Policy

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INTRODUCTION

The anticipated feasibility and effectiveness of interventions to foster citizen education depend critically on the future societal context. How appropriate a specific intervention would seem, what barriers it would encounter, what counteracting forces might render it ineffectual -- all depend on the societal context within which it has to operate.

The purpose of forecasting societal futures is to reduce the uncertainty about this future context. While numerous approaches have been applied to delineating alternative futures,¹ most of them essentially fall into two classes. One group uses the principle that social systems tend to exhibit considerable continuity through time, and amount to variations of past trends. The other group is based on some sort of model or theory about how social change takes place and what forces produce it. In the past decade or so several alternative societal futures have been projected -- some as aids to policy research for various Government agencies and business organizations, and a few as popular books.^{2/}

In the following discussion I shall attempt to do three things:

1. Summarize the tasks of citizen education in a way that is particularly suited to testing them against alternative future societal contexts;
2. Summarize the most pertinent uncertainties about this future context, based on existing studies of the future; and
3. Explore the feasibility and effectiveness of interventions to achieve these tasks as they are affected by the way society's future actually evolves.

THE TASKS OF CITIZEN EDUCATION

Two questions are of central concern:

What really is the basic problem in citizen education?

What are reasonable expectations regarding outcomes from citizen education programs or other interventions?

I hope to indicate the answer to the first question by the end of this section. The remainder of the discussion will deal with the second question.*

It will be useful to summarize here the components of effective citizen education in terms of the tasks involved. (For more information on this subject, the reader is referred to the draft document, "Citizen Education Today," prepared by the National Center for Voluntary Action under contract with the U.S. Office of Education, Citizen Education Office.) These tasks are not those of childhood and youth, nor are they the responsibility solely of the schools. They are tasks of lifelong education, and are contributed to (or in some cases vitiated by) all social institutions — particularly those of Government, education, business, labor, the media, the home, the community, and voluntary associations.

*Commentators on Harman's essay formulated the essential issues of citizen education in these ways. Betty Reardon believes the central issues for citizen education are "how the values articulated in the Declaration of Independence will apply equally to all Americans, and how the U.S. will adjust to a future in which our global hegemony gives way to a just participatory role in a world system based on equity."

Lee Anderson summarizes major issues as "What is the character of the problems and difficulties individual citizens encounter in relating to the culture of modernized societies?...Who experiences these problems and difficulties most intensely? When in the life cycle are they particularly salient?"

Ronald Brunner comments: "The traditional goal of citizen education in a democratic society is to enhance the ability and the opportunity of every citizen to think independently and effectively, and to act on the result in the face of inevitable uncertainty."

The tasks are of two sorts: those that contribute to preparing the individual for effective citizenship, and those that correct for ways in which an imperfect society disenfranchises citizens and erects barriers to full enjoyment of citizen privileges and powers. With no pretense of being definitive, the following list is adequate for present purposes:

Preparing for Effective Citizenship

1. Measures to impart understanding of society and its institutions; of the basic values and premises on which a democratic society is built, and the specific political, legal, and social institutions that express these; of the role of law and problems of the contemporary legal system; of the mechanisms of political participation, representation, and access; of the serious problems that beset the modern world; of global interdependence and the requirements for an effective global order.

2. Measures to develop skills of citizenship, particularly the abilities to acquire information, analyze issues, and achieve access to the political system, and the capability of self-management.

3. Measures to educe awareness of value issues and perspectives; of the difficult balance to be achieved among the fundamental values of liberty, equality, and community; of the bases for our concepts of justice, pluralism, dispersion of powers, and rights of minorities; of the transcendent human experience underlying our most basic values.

4. Measures to foster attitudes of self-esteem, the brotherhood of man, and communion with the whole.

5. Measures to encourage involvement in civil life, to enhance community self-determination, to promote acts of global citizenship.

Enfranchisement of citizens

1. Measures to increase the viability of decentralized institutions and communities — units small enough so that the individual counts.

2. Measures to reduce centralization of power and control — e.g., to enhance self-government of neighborhoods and local governments.

3. Measures to encourage a mutually exploratory mode of dealing with complex issues and problems (e.g., land use decisions that will have regional impacts), as contrasted with an adversary mode (in which the citizenry either has to bow to the superior power of large and rich institutions to carry on this kind of conflict, or has to "throw itself in front of the bulldozers" in some form of costly confrontation).

4. Measures to increase the extent to which citizens have access to a variety of viewpoints and backgrounds, communities contain a broader cross section of the total citizenry, and the tendency is reduced for whole groups to be disenfranchised because of isolation (e.g., poor, minorities).

5. Measures to strengthen the voluntary sector and to increase opportunities for citizen involvement — including involvement at regional, national, and global levels with issues that are resolvable only at those levels.*

*Lee Anderson comments: "The two classes of tasks, preparing for effective citizenship and the enfranchisement of citizens, are treated as if the two sets of tasks occupy identical positions in logical space; i.e., they are two sub-sets of a single set. This is, of course, not the case. The set of tasks relating to citizen enfranchisement emerges only because the first set of tasks is in fact impossible to achieve within the existing societal context."

While on the one hand modern society can provide time, tools, and resources for these tasks to an unprecedented extent, on the other hand it presents unique barriers to their accomplishment. The very complexity of the technical and political issues of modern industrial society inhibits the understanding necessary for effective citizen involvement. The requisite skills are difficult and time consuming to acquire.

Modern society is exceptionally confused about value issues, having put aside the old bases for value commitments and not developed satisfactory replacements. The technical and industrial powers of industrial society and the impersonality of its bureaucracies intimidate and diminish man, impeding development of healthy self-esteem. The bigness of Government and of modern technological organizations increases the difficulty of effective involvement. Urban society, from the inner city to the suburbs, has become ghettoized, so that isolated groups have neither adequate understanding of the needs and desires of other groups nor opportunities to enjoy the full privileges and powers of citizenship. The sheer quantity of available knowledge, the awesome research resources of the experts, and the intimidating complexity of computers and other knowledge-processing tools, all conspire to cow the average citizen and to convince him that he cannot understand the important political-technical issues of his time.

This, then, is the problem of citizen education: The characteristics of advanced industrialized society make it extraordinarily difficult to carry out the tasks of citizen education.*

* Anderson disputes Harman's assumption that education is relevant to the problems of citizenship, suggesting that if modern society's maladies originate outside the educational system, "the problem of citizen education lies in the fact that citizens confront problems for which educators have no solution."

ALTERNATIVE FUTURE CONTEXTS

Since the future is unknown, a range of alternative possible futures must be explored. But which alternative futures are to be examined? Among those paths to the future that are plausible, which provides the most fruitful insight? The first task is to identify a critical dimension along which some of these forecasts are arrayed.

The Importance of Interpretive Concepts

To gain the advantage of hindsight, it is helpful to imagine a similar attempt a century ago. In 1878, looking toward the decades ahead, some problems and opportunities would have been apparent. The post-Reconstruction difficulties could have been anticipated, and perhaps some of the impacts of the burgeoning railroads and the imminent tidal wave of immigration. Probably it would have been too early to see that the civic goals of education, held central by the Republic's founders, would soon be overshadowed by the goals of academic achievement and occupational preparation. Urbanization patterns might have been visible on the horizon. But the concept with the greatest interpretive value would have been that of industrialization. This would be the dynamic that would eventually make it possible for the unskilled workman who helped assemble the automobile (and even the janitor who swept the assembly floor) to buy one for himself. It would provide the means for mass dissemination of such life-changing inventions as the telephone, typewriter, phonograph, electric light, cash register, air brake, and refrigerator car. It would increase the iron and steel output more than tenfold by the end of the century, create gigantic corporations, and fuel the mushrooming of the cities. It would in time change hedonistic consumption from a vice to a virtue, and frugality from something good for the soul to something bad for the economy.

The point of this brief example is the importance of identifying the right interpretive concepts for forecasting. Without such identification, forecasting becomes a mindless projection of past trends that is only mildly illuminating, and probably seriously in error. But what are the fruitful interpretive concepts for exploring, in 1978, alternative futures for America?

An important clue comes from the recently translated work of the French historian, Fernand Braudel, "The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II."^{3/} In his introduction, Braudel explains why he has to write three separate histories at three different "levels."

The first level is the level of events. This is the history of accessions to power, revolutions, treaties, laws, wars, arms races. It is exciting, rich in human interest -- but deceptive. "We must learn to distrust this history." This is the level where one is most susceptible to the illusion that actions cause events, rather than both being manifestations of a deeper flow. On the second level is the history of groups and groupings -- of changes in governmental and economic forms, of evolutions in social customs and institutions, of the interactions of different cultures. The third level is the history of basic structures and enduring patterns. This is the level of slow-moving changes in geography and demography, and basic cultural characteristics.

At this formative "third level" of change one basic world trend overshadows practically all else in importance. It is called "economic development" or "modernization" or "industrialization"; Robert Heilbroner called it the "Great Ascent."^{4/}

The first signs of this modernization trend are visible some 10 centuries ago in the societies of Western Europe. It spread, until today hardly a group of people anywhere on the globe is unaffected. The development of capitalism after the 16th century, the growth of modern science, the Industrial Revolution are phases of this more fundamental evolution.

This basic long-term trend is absolutely central to any serious look at the future. If it continues, the modernization trend will strongly shape the future.^{5/} On the other hand, if there is a marked deviation from it, this will amount to one of the major transformations of human history — perhaps the greatest. No other uncertainty regarding the future is so crucial as this one.

In recent years, particularly during the past decade, there is strong evidence of mounting and multiple counterforces to this long-term trend. The future of all parts of world society will be profoundly affected by the outcome of this contest between trend and countertrend.

The Basic Long-Term Trend

The long-term modernization trend has several important intrinsic aspects:

1. Secularization: That is, the tendency to organize activities rationally around impersonal and utilitarian values and patterns, rather than following action prescribed by social and religious tradition. Change, rather than tradition, becomes institutionalized. Materialistic and pragmatic values predominate; e.g., unlimited material progress, expanding control over nature, acquisitiveness. In the capitalist version the person seeks his own self-interest, as he defines it, in the marketplace; the future is not determined by tradition nor achieved through organized plan, but rather it happens as a consequence of relatively autonomous units pursuing their own practical ends. In the planned economy version the collective is emphasized, as is achievement of a desired future through rational planning.

2. Industrialization of the production of goods and services. The essence of industrialization involves organizing and subdividing work into increasingly elemental (and less intrinsically significant) increments, and replacing human by machine performance of these increments. Management of production becomes optimized with respect to such technical and economic criteria as efficiency and labor productivity. The modernization trend leads to the industrialization of goods -- and then on to services and thence to more and more of human activity (e.g., health care, education, food preparation, leisure, tourism, aesthetic enjoyment).

3. Economic Rationalization of social behavior and organization, especially (a) monetization and commercialization (all things coming to be measurable by, and purchasable in units of currency); (b) economic rationalization of knowledge (the "knowledge industry"; science justified by the jobs it prepares for); and (c) predominance of economic rationality in social and political decisionmaking.

4. "Technification" of Knowledge — i.e., the tendency to count as important knowledge that which is obtained and ordered according to the prediction-and-control values of materialistic science (in other words, knowledge that is useful in generating "manipulative" technology); and consequently to downplay claims that there can be an important body of knowledge about appropriate human values and goals.

From these basic aspects follow many secondary trend components, including:

1. Technological, economic, and material growth
2. Increasing use of inanimate energy sources
3. Incorporation of an increasing fraction of human activity in the main industrialized money economy (and hence the squeezing out of much handicrafts, family farming, folk arts, etc.)
4. Increasing institutionalization of innovation
5. Increasing size of technology and centralization of control
6. Urbanization and increasing tendency for people's lives to become insulated from the natural environment and natural life processes
7. Increasing rates of use of nonrenewable resources
8. Increasing impact of human activities on the natural environment
9. Increasing power of weapons, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
10. Movement toward a single world economy with international "division of labor"
11. Increasing specialization and influence of a technical elite
12. Tendency for the ties binding the individual to society to become more impersonal
13. Acquisitive materialism becoming the main driving force and guiding ethic of society

The Emergence of Countertrend Forces

As previously noted, the last decade has seen the emergence of countertrend forces. Each of the major characteristics of the long-term modernization trend is now matched by cultural resistance. Table 1 is a striking display of components of the modernization trend and corresponding counterforce tendencies. Of course, it would be an error to assume that these opposing factors are totally new. Resistance to change and modernization has been manifest many times in the past. Examples include the 16th century misgivings over the rise of the money economy, religious opposition to the secularization of values, Luddite antagonism to labor-displacing machines, organized workers' resistance to exploitation by the factory, and the "warfare between science and religion."

In the main, however, except for the fundamental resistance to secularization that was eventually overwhelmed, this opposition was targeted at specific aspects of the modernization trend, and was often really over welfare and equity issues rather than opposition to the modernization trend per se. What is new is the simultaneous opposition to all aspects of the long-term modernization trend, with representatives in all socioeconomic classes and in both industrialized and developing nations. (Inglehart has documented the value and political shifts among Western publics and speaks of the phenomenon as "The Silent Revolution.") 6/

Even if the counterforce phenomena are real, the possibility that they could become sufficiently powerful to bring about a significant deviation from the long-term modernization trend would seem *a priori* very unlikely. Not only is the basic trend of long-standing duration — something of the order of a millenium — but also, Lewis Mumford has estimated that such a fundamental transformation as this trend shift would represent may have happened only a half dozen times in all human history.^{7/} Nevertheless, he and a number of other scholars make a strong case that the possibility needs to be taken seriously.

Table I

The "Great Ascent" -- Trend and Countertrend Components

<u>Trend</u>	<u>Countertrend</u>
<u>Basic</u>	
Secularization	"New transcendentalism"; quest for meanings
Industrialization	Reaction against "industrialization" of education, health care, agriculture, etc.
Economic rationalization	Reaction against dominance of economic rationality over ethics, social rationality, human values
"Technification" of knowledge	Search for knowledge of human values and goals
<u>Derivative</u>	
Technological, economic, and material growth	"Limits-to-growth" arguments; proposed change in qualitative nature of growth emphasis
Increasing use of inanimate energy sources	Energy conservation movement, "conservator society"
Increasing institu- tionalization of innovation	Challenge to "technological imperative"; technology assessment movement
Increasing size of technology, centrali- zation	"Small is beautiful," appropriate technology, decentralization movements

Table 1. (Continued)

Urbanization	Reruralization movement
Increasing impact on environment	Environmentalism movements, rise of ecological ethic
Increasing power of weapons	Nuclear disarmament movement
Movement toward a single world economy	Small counter self-determination movements, demands for "reshaping the international order"
Increasing specialization influence of technical elite	Politization of scientific and technical decisions, with public participation
Tendency for ties binding individual to institutions to become impersonal	New emphasis on community, family values, human relationships, human potential movement, person-liberation
Acquisitive materialism as the mainspring	Voluntary simplicity movements

There are actually two kinds of forces acting together that make such a transmutation possible:

(1) Opposing tendencies to the components of the basic long-term modernization trend; and (2) A developing vision of a transformed society, and of the kind of politics that would tend to move toward that society.

Tendencies Opposing the Modernization Trend

The countertrend tendencies appear to come about in four ways: (a) as a reaction against aspects of the basic long-term trend; (b) as a further development of aspects of the basic long-term trend; (c) as a reaffirmation of parts of cultural heritages and racial experiences that were temporarily overrun by the modernization trend; and (d) as a definition of alternative development goals for Third World societies.

a. The majority of the items in the right-hand column of Table 1 are reactions against aspects of the economic-development trend. Examples are: environmentalism as a reaction against increasing impact of human activities on the physical environment; the "limits to growth" reaction against the consequences of unlimited material and economic growth; "appropriate technology" as a counter to the consequences of technological growth that is resource-extravagant; a "new materialism" reacting against man's growing isolation from the natural environment; and dissatisfaction with a consumer society's de facto goals of mere satisfaction of artificially stimulated material desires. 8/

b. A second component of the countertrend arises as a further development of certain aspects of the basic long-term trend. Of all the consequences of the modernization trend, perhaps the one most widely acclaimed is the increase in standard of living, that includes decreased working hours and increased free time, higher educational levels, and increased

overall awareness of the evolution of human societies and the diversity of world cultures. But these very attributes have generated opposition to the trend. Rising awareness levels undoubtedly help account for rising insistence on self-determination on the part of individuals, minority groups, women, ex-colonies, subcultures, and communities. Persons with far higher educational attainments than are required for available jobs are discontent, sing the "blue-collar blues," and demand "meaningful work." Increased educational levels lead to insistence that future-shaping scientific and technical decisions (e.g., regarding dependence on nuclear power, or development of supersonic aircraft) are too important to be left to experts.*

c. A third component springs from the realization that the secularization of values estranged man from his inner experience. Thus, there arose, particularly in the past decade and a half, a new search for transcendental meanings. This has been most conspicuous, perhaps, among the young. It takes bizarre, cultish, faddish forms at times, but there seems little doubt that a quiet turning inward is evident among all age groups—a renewed interest in exploring the spiritual dimensions of existence. The cultural interest in yoga, Tibetan wisdom, transcendental meditation, and the occult is paralleled by scientific exploration into biofeedback training, consciousness research, and psychic phenomena.

*Betty Reardon questions whether disenfranchised groups would agree with the issues identified by Dr. Harman. "While he appears to support the trends toward liberation and participation, the primary concerns and issues are not those which would be identified by those most in need of liberation: the colonized, the poor, ethnic minorities, and women; rather, they reflect the perceptions of the global elites. Granted, he is part of a humanistic, dissenting elite, however, he speaks from the vantage point of the technologically advanced, Euro-urban, male oriented society."

Having accepted the physicists' assertions that a "solid" object like a table is mostly empty space, and that one can sensibly talk about "anti-matter" and "black holes in space," the mystic's experiencing of nonphysical aspects of reality, and the inner experiences that have formed the bases for all the world's religious traditions, seem less dismissible as complete delusion. It was with supreme arrogance that a previous generation of scientists had proclaimed that the accumulated knowledge of all the world's religions was based wholly on illusion. More revolutionary than simply a search for guiding values, this third aspect of the counterforce involves insistence that a transcendental basis exists, in some sense discoverable and explorable, for man's deepest value commitments; the complete secularization of values, it is argued, had been in error.

d. While the countertrend is primarily an advanced-nation phenomenon, yet another aspect can be found in some of the developing countries and among their sympathizers in the developed countries. This is manifested as an unwillingness to accept the Western pattern of economic development, and the determination to achieve what Goulet has called "liberatory development."^{9/} Like Western economic development, "liberatory development" aims to improve the material conditions of life. But it emphasizes: (1) popular autonomy and a nonelitist mode; (2) eliminating patterns of dependence and domination; (3) freedom from oppressive kinds and institutionalizations of technology; (4) liberation from class and race discrimination and from cultural and psychic alienation; and (5) "cultural, spiritual, and aesthetic maturation." This concept of development builds on the accomplishments of the basic long-term modernization trend, but rejects a future that implies uncritical extrapolation of that trend. Thus, "liberatory development" also "represents a countertrend force.*"

*Betty Reardon comments: "Citizenship education for a better future must deal in the present with hunger and poverty, repression and discrimination, militarism and violence. These trends are to me equally as significant as technology, centralization, and alienation."

A Developing Vision of a Transformed Society

The analysis that follows is based on numerous sources, including those associated with such movements as: appropriate technology 10/ liberatory development, 11/ voluntary simplicity, 12/ conserver society, 13/ feminist and person liberation 14/ human potential, 15/ ecology, 16/ decentralization, 17/ demanagement, 18/ new transcendentalism, 19/ attempts to synthesize all of these movements, 20/ and social scientific studies of the predicament of modern societies. 21/ It attempts to identify the definitive characteristics of the vision of a transformed society which is implicit in the countertrend forces, and also to identify the sociopolitical dynamics of transformation.

This new vision of the future can be discerned in a multitude of signs — especially movements, writing, political speeches, and emerging conceptualizations. It is essentially distinct from either Marxism or Liberalism, although it shares some of the same human goals. The image is transnational, with different emphases coming from different cultural backgrounds. Because it is (or may be) emerging, no clear articulation of it is coming from any single country or any particular political movement.

We shall summarize this attempted synthesis in five defining characteristics of this image of a post-modernizing future:

- a. Man in harmony with nature
- b. Man in harmony with man
- c. Individual self-actualization
- d. Cultural decentralization
- e. Globalization of global issues

Man in Harmony with Nature. This first characteristic contrasts sharply with the exploitative attitude toward nature that has been a hallmark of industrializing society. Primitive cultures typically had more cooperative, less exploitative relationships with nature. In some cases (e.g., many American Indian tribes) there was a clear tradition of caring for the earth. Thus, there is much precedent for the ecological ethic that now seems dictated by increasingly serious environmental problems.

Just as nature experiments with life forms and celebrates diversity, so in the post-modernizing future a diversity of cultures would be fostered. This encouragement of diversity is primarily an expression of the strengthening value of self-determination. However, it also promotes sound ecological development, since resilience of an ecosystem is achieved through the diversity of participating organisms. The law of hybrid vigor is as pertinent in cultural evolution as in biology.

This characteristic also involves a reassertion of spirit. This fact is evident in the "new transcendentalism" groupings in literature mentioned earlier; in survey data such as Yankelovich's identification of a "new naturalism" trend, religious but largely noninstitutionalized; 22/ and in the observations of social scientists. 23/ A noteworthy aspect of the counterculture movements in the industrialized countries is insistence that an ubiquitous "perennial wisdom" underlies all major religious traditions and most primitive religions (however much the emphases may vary from one tradition to another), affirming the basic spirituality and oneness of man. (Note, for example, the counterculture adoption of the Theosophist concept of the coming world order, the "Age of Aquarius.") This common root experience of a persistently rediscovered "perennial wisdom," reflected in the many diverse cultures of the globe, offers one promising basis for global understanding, perhaps the most significant basis.

Man in Harmony with Man. The envisioned post-modernizing world society emphasizes community in the small, and global cooperation in the large. The institutions are to be personcentered and nondiscriminatory with regard to sex, race, and culture. Where large institutions are necessary, these need to be comprised of small, vital, face-to-face communities.*

On the world scale, there is to be a "great leveling" of rich and poor societies, not in gross national product (since that is only one rough measure of well-being) but in equity, in equality of opportunity. The Western concept of economic development toward a "consumer society" is to be eschewed in favor of "liberatory development," emphasizing liberation of spirit and energy, self-reliance, preservation of cultural identity, and reassertion of group history. Gone will be the mental yoke of superstition, illiteracy, fatalism, self-denigration, submission to external authority — replaced by emphasis on human productiveness, autonomy, and global cooperation. For these conditions to be possible for the individual societies, the international order must be reshaped in a manner compatible with the legitimate goals of developed, developing, and socialist nations. 24/

*Kenneth Prewitt questions the actual viability of small, decentralized political units. "Unfortunately, citizenship in decentralized, small, face-to-face political units has not fared well. Though limited, the research points in one direction. Unless there is enforced consensus by tightly restricting membership, the communal democracies have a difficult time containing political conflicts without resorting to those same institutional arrangements — division of political labor, representation, decision-rules — which characterize the larger society. Moreover, smallness can be suffocating."

In "Towards a New International Order," the development task is described as follows:

The failure of the present order results essentially from the inadequacy of a quantitative and economic approach in attempting to solve in an uncoordinated and isolated fashion problems that are global and interdependent... Development... must not be limited to an elite, but must aim at the material, cultural, and spiritual fulfillment of the whole population, which must be involved in the transformation of their society.... Among the industrialized nations efforts must be made to secure development in another direction in order to put an end to uncontrolled growth, with its consequences of wastes and inequities, a deteriorating environment, and a crisis in values—the source of tensions and of moral underdevelopment.^{25/}

Individual Self-Actualization. The new order is to be one that fosters movement from self-subordination toward self-actualization. Especially in the workplace and in the development of Third World countries is this emphasis on self-actualization of central importance.

The basic idea here is perhaps best summarized in Maslow's concept of "deficiency needs" and selfactualization needs. He observes that persons whose "deficiency needs" are not adequately satisfied are driven by them. Those whose "deficiency needs" (for food, shelter, warmth, sex, belonging, esteem) are reasonably well satisfied then are motivated by "selfactualization" or "being" needs. ^{26/} In the words of a counterculture slogan, "We don't want to have more — we want to be more."

Manifestations of this emphasis in the industrialized countries are to be found especially in the various "liberation" movements (of women, minorities, the elderly, etc.) and in the worker self-government and "industrial democracy" movements of Northern Europe. In the Third World it is seen most clearly as an insistence on casting off all shackles of poverty and exploitation (by landlords, rich ruling classes, imperialists). Through focusing on self-development and building together, the individual actualizes his higher fulfillment.

Cultural Decentralization. Implicit in the new vision is a repudiation of the centralist tendencies of both capitalist and socialist management and production, as well as the continued urbanization tendencies of industrializing society. Espoused instead is decentralization — of population concentration, of community, of agriculture, of management and control, of technology, of economic production. 27/ This is not a new theme in the United States — it is the tradition of Jefferson and Emerson and the agrarian movement; Justice Brandeis wrote of "the curse of bigness" in business. 28/ It is an aspect of the Third World reaffirmation of cultural identity, and its growing doubts about the wisdom of adopting Western large-scale technology, Green Revolution and all.

The issue of decentralization is particularly apparent in the appropriate technology movement — in insistence on "human-scale technology under human control." Stavrianos phrases the shift as being "from aristo-technology to demo-technology." 29/ This issue will be one of the main themes of the forthcoming United Nations Conference of Science and Development. It is already an expressed concern of the International Labor Organization, the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, and the World Bank.

Increasing insistence on participatory democratic procedures is closely related to decentralization politics. So also is the politization of scientific and technical decisions (e.g., location of nuclear power plants, control of hazardous substances).*

Globalization of Issues. Coexisting with the decentralization characteristic, and not in conflict with it, is the global management of affairs that, by their very nature, are concerns of the entire population of the earth. These include use and care of the oceans and atmosphere, exploitation of nonrenewable resources, and control of weapons of mass destruction.

The New Politics of Liberation

Equally important to accurate assessment of the plausibility of this alternative world development is depiction of the change process envisaged. This process is to be distinguished from both the liberal and the classical radical strategies.

*Kenneth Prewitt argues for greater attention to political aspects of alternative futures: "There is a political context for the conception of citizenship and therefore a basis for talking about alternative modes of citizenship education. I search for a theory of government which would inform either the extrapolated or transformed futures described by Harman, and I find only code words such as 'decentralization' and 'participatory democracy'. . ."

In the liberal democracies, social change has been funded during recent decades by economic growth and implemented through centralized government programs. The new vision repudiates both assumptions — that change is a matter of money spent, and that change comes from the top down.

On the other hand, the classical political revolution is not the pattern either. In the Third World particularly, revolutionary violence is seen — as by Fanon 30/— as necessary for certain stages. But this is not the primary process seen for the metamorphic change to post-modernizing society, especially as it is represented in the countertrend movements of the industrialized nations.

The basic strategy of the "new politics of liberation" is "withdrawal of consent from institutions"^{31/} — i.e., delegitimizing. The solution is not seen as amassing power to alter exploitation (the old leftist strategy) nor devising programs to "help others" (the liberal approach). It is, rather, to change the basic relationships between persons and the institutions to which they are (unconsciously) enslaved.*

*Prewitt questions the implications of withdrawal of consent: "It seems that the most efficacious thing the citizen can do is withdraw consent from the institutions of society, to delegitimize those institutions. Set aside what this means for society and inquire only into what it implies for citizenship. Harman is asking the citizen to 'exit' from society without actually leaving it. This is an ambiguous role at best, a profound alienation at worst."

Whereas social change has been attempted in the past by bureaucratically managed programs, this change is postulated to come about by grass-roots permeation-not by a tightly organized effort, but through autonomous groups guided by a common vision. These "new politics" groups are keenly alert to the danger of being co-opted, so they tend to be chameleonic and flexible. The networks of which they are the nodes tend to be quasi-invisible, "composed of autonomous segments which are organizationally self-sufficient, any of which could survive the elimination of all the others... (these) movements do not have a single paramount leader who can control or even speak for the entire movement. Each cell has its own (leader who) may not be recognized as a leader by members of other segments of the movement... (This) is precisely the sort of pattern consistent with a vision of 'the global village,' 'debureaucratization,' 'decentralization,' and 're-humanization'" (Hine).32/

The basic theme is not mass manipulation, but mass awakening. It is characteristic of these movements that the rhetoric may include patently unreasonable demands, whose function is to "awaken consciousness," to "radicalize." The long-term purposes of the movement have to be discerned underneath these surface radical tactics.

As to the individual participants, they seem to be in part at least guided by Henry David Thoreau's injunctions: "Let your life be a counterfriction to stop the machine."

Role of the Communications Revolution


We have seen that two factors that make metamorphosis to a post-modernizing society a plausible scenario are the push of the various countertrend forces and the pull of a vision of a new society. A third factor of a somewhat different sort is the communications revolution - the combined effects of worldwide electronic communication, rapid and cheap travel, and dramatically increased literacy levels. The overall result is that knowledge of the world's problems and also the countertrend arguments, is widespread and travels rapidly. These developments make it possible for localized minority movements to become part of the world's consciousness to an unprecedented degree, and to produce prompt effects. Changes which once would have taken centuries now seem plausible in mere decades.

An Assortment of Alternative Futures

By concentrating on basic structures and enduring patterns, we have identified a critical dimension along which to scan alternative futures. At one end of the scale is a future in which the forces prove to be present for transformation to a post-modernizing future. At the other end is an extrapolative future in which the transforming forces turn out to have been illusory, and the major societal trends of the past continue without significant change (see Figure 1). Of these two extremes, I have devoted most of the discussion to the transforming future, because it is much less familiar. Daniel Bell's "The Coming of Post-Industrial Society" provides a good description of the extrapolative future.

There is another, orthogonal dimension along which forecasts can be arrayed -- that of "success" vs "failure." For example, the forecasts of Herman Kahn and Daniel Bell tend to be in the "extrapolative-success" quadrant. Robert Heilbroner's dismal "Human Prospect" would be placed in the "extrapolative-failure" area. A number of the "New Age" writers (e.g., L. S. Stavrianos, Mark Satin) describe futures in the "transformational-success" quadrant. No one seems to have been very interested in describing in detail a future in which the forces for transformation prevail, but the society just doesn't work, although a number of writers have expressed apprehension of this failure.

Figure 1. - Types of Societal Forecasts



How might various citizen education measures fare in these futures? What kinds of measures would tend to be proposed, what barriers might they face, and how successful would they be? What are reasonable expectations for citizen education measures, in terms of the path that overall society makes?

To answer these questions, I shall first define a number of critical issue areas where resolution would be very different in the four types of future contexts, and then examine the relation of citizen education to these issues. With that analysis as additional background I shall comment more specifically on the compatibility of various citizen education measures with these four types of future contexts.

CRITICAL ISSUE AREAS

The long-term modernization trend has affected society in several ways. Four areas stand out in particular: man's relation to the natural environment, the individual's institutionalized role in society, the quality of institutionalized decisionmaking, and the values and goals of individuals and society.

Throughout the modernization period man has in certain respects gained progressively more and more control over the natural environment. However, the future appears to hold serious problems of resource exhaustion and environmental deterioration. Attempts to resolve these problems will differ within the alternative futures.

The economic productivity of the individual has become increasingly emphasized as industrialization progressed, and the role has tended to be equated with jobs in the economy. Economic rationality has become increasingly influential in social decisionmaking. Societal values and goals have become increasingly materialistic. All of these tendencies have consequences that are viewed differently in the various future contexts.

Thus, in attempting to understand the complexities of finding an appropriate stand for citizen education, it will be helpful to examine the relationship between citizen education and the following issue areas:

1. Energy and environment
2. Work and citizen roles
3. Industrial-economic rationality in social decision-making
4. Societal values and goals

Energy and Environment

Quite apart from the foregoing arguments that a major transformation of industrialized society may be taking place, there is an imminent change that will affect the lives of all Americans. That is the depletion of abundant and cheap energy. Industrial society was built on cheap fossil fuel; it remains to be seen how it will survive the transition to scarce and expensive energy.

The facts are blunt and simple. Oil and gas supply in the United States will decline from here on, even if prices are allowed to rise. The contribution of nuclear energy is limited by social resistance and time lags. Solar and wind energy will eventually pick up a good bit of the load, but not before the end of the century. As for fusion, maybe some day we will have it -- but not as soon, not as clean, and not as cheap as originally advertised. Geothermal will not contribute much for a long time. Coal is called the transition fuel, but there are tremendous problems associated with using coal to replace oil and gas in the quantities contemplated. So this country will increasingly depend on imported oil, with the attendant hazard that this entails. Furthermore, world oil demand will probably outstrip supply before the end of the century and America will be faced with the unpleasant decision of whether the rich and powerful fill their so-called energy needs, or sacrifice to enable the developing countries to survive.

There is a strong correlation between a nation's total energy use, its flow-through of other resources, its total economic activity, and the overall environmental impact of that activity. These relationships can be changed over time, but because they are tied up with the country's whole way of life this is not an easy thing to accomplish. Thus from the standpoints of both environmental protection and the limits on nonrenewable resources, there are powerful reasons why the United States should severely cut back on its energy demands, to buy time until the long-range resolution of the energy problem is more clear. Energy conservation appears to be essential to both the short-run and the long-run solutions.

However, there seem to be equally powerful reasons why precipitous demand reduction would be unwise. They hinge on the effects on the economy and on employment. If the past relationships between economic growth, labor productivity, and employment obtain, limitations on energy use and other resource use would seem to forebode a future chronic and serious unemployment problem.

Should citizen education place strong emphasis on raising awareness with respect to long-range issues of energy conservation, environmental protection, and lowering nuclear risks? Or should this emphasis be tempered by concern for economic health and employment problems? Clearly, the answer is not a simple one.

It is important to recall that Western society had to learn (after the Middle Ages) the concept of bettering the physical environment through material progress. After World War II people had to learn that, whereas frugality had been a virtue and hedonistic consumption a vice, thenceforth the role of "consumer" was to be a virtuous calling, and frugality was bad for the economy. These learnings involved changing some of the most fundamental assumptions of the culture; they did not come quickly or easily.

If any of these traits prove to lead toward a nonviable future, to unlearn them also involves change at a very fundamental level — change that would involve all of a total interrelated system of beliefs, values, attitudes, and expectations, and the social institutions which those underlie.

Work and Citizen Roles

Perhaps if there were enough work, many of society's social problems would disappear. National budgets would be more easily balanced; welfare costs would be down. Teenagers would enter the work forces; the elderly could find part-time employment. Discrimination against minorities would decrease. Less human energy and resources would be wasted, and more opportunity would exist for individual self-fulfillment. Urban decay could be slowed or halted, bringing relief to a host of related problem areas—crime, drug abuse, housing, school problems, and city financial crises. There would be less pressure to neglect preserving the environment or conserving energy when those actions threaten jobs. There would be less resistance to providing substantial aid to the poorer countries. Failure to solve the employment problem creates a barrier to resolving other problems.

As with the energy problem, an impressive array of statistics can be summoned forth to argue the fine points of the situation. The real problem, however, is intrinsic to advanced stages of industrialization, no matter how a particular society may go about disguising it. The central long-term thrust of industrialized society is toward production of increasing (material) wealth per capita. In the end there are two possible directions this trend can go — toward more per capita consumption of wealth or toward less per capita time spent at working to produce wealth. Environmental and resource limits eventually preclude indefinite expansion in the first direction (even assuming that people can be trained to want more and more). On the other hand, abrupt reduction of working time presents problems of a different sort, since it is mainly through work that persons maintain their meaningful participation in society. In fact, with rising educational levels there is increasing need for meaningful, creative work.

As industrialization proceeds, dependence of persons on the economy tends to increase, and their ability to subsist independently by their own efforts decreases. But technology's contributions to increasing labor productivity have resulted in a decreasing fraction of the adult population being required in production activities. Thus, more and more welfare and other forms of transfer payments (and their equivalent in various subtly disguised forms of featherbedding and makework) replace contribution to production as a basis for income distribution. This has an assortment of disadvantages. The role of consumer does not give the same sense of satisfaction and of affirmation by one's fellow citizens that comes from a role in needed production activities. Furthermore, those citizens who work resent supporting those who don't.

With rising educational levels have come expectations that people's work lives would utilize their talents and challenge them to develop their potential. Unfortunately, a significant fraction of the jobs in industrialized society is neither intrinsically challenging, nor directly related to inspiring societal challenges. The result has been widespread anomie and complaints of underemployment.^{33/}

Yet in spite of these complaints of insufficient opportunities to apply abilities, society has no dearth of tasks whose accomplishment would be worthwhile and beneficial. However, many of these tasks (e.g., beautification, conservation, community services, caring) cannot be easily structured in the profitmaking private sector. There are well-known disadvantages (e.g., high taxes, bureaucratic inefficiency) to structuring them in the public sector. They could perhaps be performed in the extended family and the voluntary sector as they existed a half century or a century ago. However, since the industrialized economy became the dominant institution in society, the extended family has diminished and voluntary associations often seem puny by comparison with the giant institutions of business and government.

Should education continue the emphasis on academic achievement and occupational preparation to fit students for the increasingly intense competition for jobs of any sort, let alone jobs that make full use of their academic preparation and bring satisfaction and fulfillment? Or should it place more emphasis on preparing for constructive citizen roles, including training for citizen involvement to help change unsatisfactory characteristics of society? Again, it is not a simple choice. As with the issues of energy and environment, at the heart of the difficulty are fundamental trends of long standing. To go with these trends is probably to fail to address the right problem, and to oppose them is a formidable undertaking.

The Fundamental Role of Industrial-Economic Rationality

My purpose here has not been to analyze these specific problems with any great degree of thoroughness, but rather to point out how fundamentally they are built into the basic industrial-economic rationality of society. The energy dilemma is a dilemma because the demands of the economy make it impossible to cut back to the extent that prudence indicates we should. The even more fundamental employment dilemma -- of society's not being able to provide enough structured, constructive work roles to go around -- is intrinsic to industrialized society's placing the economy in such a central position.

The extent to which economic rationality has supplanted more humanistic rationalities and pervades all social transactions is far greater than assumed at first thought. Prevailing economic accounting methods tend to force all activities into the mainstream economy. Exchanges which once were performed, with caring, in the household and community (e.g., much food and clothing production, care of the aged) become commodities served out by large, impersonal corporations. Other exchanges that remain in the household are not counted in economic indicators (like the GNP) --and hence psychologically seem to "not count." (Thus, the housewife feels a pressure to "get a job," partly so her

activities in the society will be counted. In like manner, voluntary citizen participation is "not counted" in the impersonal and non-civic-minded economy.)

Even more important in some ways is the steady encroachment of economic rationality into all aspects of societal decisionmaking. Basic sociopolitical decisions at whatever level— community or national — involve noneconomic factors and often, explicitly or (usually) implicitly, basic metaphysical issues. Yet as the long-term trend has evolved, more and more these fundamental philosophical concerns have been more and more overwhelmed by the apparent power of economic rationality. Citizens have been persuaded that the most rational and politically satisfactory decision rationale involves incorporating as faithfully as possible all relevant factors into an economic framework. Awareness of the extent to which this process distorts humanistic values has come to be largely suppressed. The question "How much is a human life worth in dollars?" has apparently become a meaningful.

Economic rationality is characterized by concern for precision in putting relevant data in quantitative form; by emphasis on such quantifiable criteria as efficiency, productivity, and dollar cost per unit of output; and by comparison of direct monetary costs and benefits in judging among alternatives. It focuses on how society chooses to employ scarce productive resources that have alternative uses. It handles the future rationally through letting future values have an appropriately discounted influence on present decisions. It is adaptable to handling uncertainty and risk through probabilistic methods (e.g., the probability of a devastating nuclear accident).

Economic rationality is favored for bureaucratic selection and justification of decisions because of its credibility. It provides a set of rules for making choices that can be supported on empirical and logical grounds and are relatively defensible against a charge of biased value judgments. It can demonstrate to the taxpayer what he is getting for the tax dollar. It impresses with its quantitative hardheadedness.

In fact, it is bureaucratically favored in both Government and business primarily because it allows the decision-maker to retreat to a safe, impersonal distance from the consequences of his decision. It is much less unpleasant to fire an employee on the basis of his quantitative sales record than to confront him with a judgment that in intangible ways he is disruptive to the organization. Economic rationality helps conceal the consequences of social choices on future generations (whose rights and welfare are "discounted" to the point that it seems rational that they should not be a matter of concern) or on the poor and wretched populations of the earth (whose welfare, together with that of the living environment, is dismissed in economic rationality as mere "externalities").

Lest these comments sound merely deprecative, it is important to note the positive accomplishments of economic rationality. Economics, like science, contributed greatly to the democratization of authority -- the latter through the public validation and dissemination of knowledge, and the former through providing a rational accounting framework for debate. Thus the sociopolitical contribution of economic rationality in the history of democratic government, self-determination, and person-liberation is most significant.

However, the impressive achievements of the quantified techniques of economic rationality must not be allowed to obscure the mischief that arises when this rationality is elevated from technique to dogma. Economic rationality has come to substitute as a pseudo-ethic in making societal decisions. It has been given this place because citizens have become exceptionally confused about the eternal value issues. The encroachment is insidious because it all sounds so reasonable.

Should citizen education include content which constitutes a challenge to such a subtle but fundamental aspect of modern society?

Knowledge of Values and Goals

This moral confusion is largely related to the way in which what I earlier termed the "technification" of knowledge led to the erosion of knowledge about values and their origins.

A brief reminder will serve to recall well-known characteristics of the dominant scientific paradigm. The primary emphasis is on quantitative data and on observing the objective world through empirical measurement. Explanations tend to be reductionistic (explaining broad happenings in terms of elemental phenomena) and models to be deterministic. Science is basically value-inattentive, although it is dominated by the prediction-and-control values of the industrializing society in which it evolved. Technical and economic values play a commanding role in setting research priorities.

There has always been another kind of knowledge, of course, represented in the humanities and religions. This emphasizes human subjective experience. Here the concern is more with accurate representation of the qualitative, rather than on what can be quantified. Explanations tend to be holistic, and models teleological rather than deterministic. For example, organisms are considered as wholes and their motivations and purposes are considered to be relevant data. This knowledge is value-focused on what is wholesome for human and societal growth and development. As the prestige of positivistic science increased, this second kind of knowledge tended to be considered of secondary importance, or explained away in terms of the first. Remember the "warfare between science and religion," which science presumably won?

The present value crisis -- the crisis over what values and goals should guide our fabulously powerful manipulative capabilities -- has its roots here. Every stable society that has ever existed on the globe, ancient or modern, Eastern or Western, has derived its basic value commitments from this

area of subjective experience which our Western scientific-technological zeal has tended to downgrade if not debunk. As positivistic science eroded the transcendental base for Judeo-Christian values (or, more accurately, for the perennial wisdom of all the world's religious traditions), citizens have become like a ship with powerful engines but no chart or compass.

Both within the scientific community and in the broader culture, these two kinds of knowledge are coming to be recognized as complementary, as shedding different kinds of light on the totality of human experience. Scientific explorations into subjective phenomena — e.g., unconscious process, hypnosis, psychosomatic illness, biofeedback training— are being supplemented with new discoveries in such areas as consciousness research and psychic phenomena. Whenever the nature of man has been probed deeply, whether in the context of ancient esoteric or modern scientific endeavors, the predominant fact emerging is the duality of his experience. He is found to be both physical and spiritual, with neither explainable in terms of the other. Thus, scientific (physicalistic) and religious (transcendental) metaphors are complementary. Neither contradicts the other; both are needed to deal with man's wholeness.

Contrasting images of man and society. This dual image of man, as both physical and spiritual, living in two realms, prevailed among the founders of the Nation. It is implicit in the Freemasonry tradition that strongly influenced almost all the signers of the Declaration of Independence and delegates to the Constitutional Convention; their sense of what was to guide the new Nation is commemorated in the symbolism of the Great Seal on the back of the dollar bill.^{34/} For a time this image appeared to have been rendered obsolete, victim of the impressive accomplishments of positivistic science. It appears now to be renascent.

The image of democratic society expressed in the statements of the Nation's founders is compatible with this dual image of man and also with an influential image from earlier times —the Greek concept of Paidea. Robert Hutchins describes the "learning society" in which learning, citizenship, and

all its institutions are directed to this end. This is what the Athenians did... They made their society one designed to bring all its members to the fullest development of their highest powers.... Education was not a segregated activity, conducted for certain hours, in certain places, at a certain time of life. It was the aim of the society.... The Athenian was educated by the culture, by Paidea. 35/

Paidea was the educating matrix of the society, involving all its institutions. The highest and central theme of Paidea was the individual's "search for the Divine Center." 36/

The images seem to reveal a central issue of citizen education. Earlier I summarized the tasks of citizen education as distilled from numerous writings and statements on the subject. These tasks of citizen education are much more compatible with the Paidea image of society than with the economic image, and with a spiritual rather than a materialistic image of man. What seemed to be a neutral definition of citizen education turned out to be not so neutral with regard to societal goals.

CITIZEN EDUCATION MEASURES IN ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

I am now ready to address the second of the two questions asked in the beginning:

What are reasonable expectations regarding adoption of and outcomes from citizen education programs or other interventions?

It will suffice to examine four bases. Consider two futures — one an extrapolative future in which the trends of the past tend to continue, and the other a transforming future in which the forces for transformation earlier identified are strong enough to bring about a major change. Consider also two alternative stances for citizen education — one tending to "go with" the dominant tendency in society, and the other tending to oppose it (see Figure 2). I shall briefly examine the type and probable efficacy of citizen education interventions in each of the four cases:

1. Extrapolative future; citizen education "going with"
2. Extrapolative future; citizen education opposing
3. Transforming future; citizen education "going with"

4. Transforming future; citizen education opposing.*

Extrapolative Future: Citizen Education "Going With"

This is a situation in which the society is assumed to be following a path somewhat like that described by Bell as "post-industrial society," and citizen education is essentially committed to maintaining and increasing the viability of that society. Thus, it includes emphasis on understanding and preparing for participation in a social system of managed capitalism, with increasing centralization and concentration of economic and political power. Citizen education stresses faith in rationality, planning, science, and technology to obtain satisfactory resolution of complex societal problems. Skills of citizenship include strong emphasis on scientific and management background, in preparation for involvement with institutionalized social change. Value positions include promoting fair and adequate social welfare. While on the one hand equity issues are stressed, on the other hand there is a caution against extreme egalitarianism — egalitarianism that recognizes neither excellence nor the

*Ronald Brunner states: "In my view, neither of the two futures should be taken as a societal determinant of citizen education policy nor should the post-modernizing vision be taken as the goal of citizen education policy. These futures and this vision should play the much more modest role of data on the ideological tendencies of the current era, to be included along with other data in curriculums and the media of mass communication."

Figure 2. - Four Cases for Examination

Citizen
education
stance

Extrapolative

Transforming

"Going
with"

Opposing

	Extrapolative	Transforming
"Going with"		
Opposing		

importance of financial and status incentives in bringing society the accomplishments of modern business and industry, and that makes entitlement claims which may endanger the vitality of the overall productive system. The content of citizen education is strongly influenced by society's movement toward a "services and knowledge" economy, with increasing numbers of intellectuals involved in what Galbraith has termed the "technostructure."*

Because citizen education is assumed to be **aligned** with the direction society is heading, there is little problem with institutional and financial support. There is somewhat of a problem, however, with dissidents who perceive a different societal path as desirable, and tend to be a disruptive influence.

*Prewitt remarks on the need to make citizenship meaningful "even in the extrapolated future. How might citizens accommodate themselves to the increasing specialization of politics? What criteria, humanistic as well as rationalistic, might be used to select among competing policies in the provider state? Can the Government be used to bring to account non-state actors, such as the scientific and technological communities, without itself becoming unaccountable?"

Extrapolative Future: Citizen Education Opposing

This is a case that highlights a basic dilemma in citizen education. In any society whose people aspire to be politically, culturally, and humanly free, the education of its citizens has two aspects. One is socialization—promoting values and beliefs and developing skills that conserve the character of the particular society and make it viable. The other is transcending socialization—encouraging self-awareness and fulfillment, and developing independence of spirit and thought and the ability to engage in social criticism and creative political activity. The second aspect is very much muted in traditional societies.

But in American tradition it has always been strong. "Know thyself" has been honored in principle at least, and citizens have taken pride in "the continuing American Revolution" and the radical stream that has emerged as populism, abolitionism, unionism, women's suffrage, civil rights, environmentalism, consumerism, and a host of minority group movements. The citizen education defined in the beginning of our discussion as involving two components—preparing for effective citizenship and enfranchisement of citizens—includes both of these educational aspects.

In the case being considered, the socialization-transcending aspect predominates, and citizen education belongs to the previously described "countertrend," aiming at a "post-modernizing" society. To raise misgivings about where the modernization trend would take us if continued indefinitely is to fundamentally challenge the status quo. To argue for reinstatement of a transcendental base for societal values and goals is to criticize the pretensions to comprehensiveness of a materialistic science that, in the past at least, has been guilty of denying the validity of the spiritual experience which slipped through the net of its methodology. To encourage citizen participation in the vital reassessment underway is to encourage creative radicalism. To insist that all forms of disfranchisement, however subtle, need to be rooted out is to challenge time-honored characteristics of the social order.

This is a case where the forces of historical inertia and of economic rationality are overpowering. Citizen education as radical criticism will tend to encounter barriers and may be subtly rendered ineffective. In this case many of the recommendations and goals will be viewed as impractical (e.g., ignoring the very real dictates of the economy), irresponsible (e.g., disregarding the need to maintain economic growth so less fortunate countries can be helped), pessimistic (e.g., advocating needless austerity), defeatist (e.g., abandoning the noblest goals of man such as space exploration), romantic (e.g., attempting to turn back the clock to a pastoral paradise that never was), retrogressive (e.g., rejecting technological accomplishment for a "simpler" life), agitative (e.g., promoting discontent), and subversive.

Transforming Future: Citizen Education "Going With"

Our third case assumes that society is undergoing metamorphosis to a post-modernizing society, and citizen education is aiding that process. The transformation is not without its problems. From a material standpoint the standard of living appears to decrease. The necessity of serious energy conservation has been recognized, and in many diverse ways the impact of the new frugality is felt. Society considers it has a serious obligation to provide meaningful social roles for all who desire them.

However, it is no longer assumed that these roles will all be jobs in the private and public sectors. As the realization has spread that the voluntary sector provides the key to employment dilemmas, annual financial support in the tens of billions of dollars has been made available (partly through liberalized law relating to giving, and partly through entitlement programs). A host of voluntary associations and nonprofit entrepreneurial activities provide a diversity of challenging roles ranging from neighborhood reconstruction corps to sophisticated research tasks and citizen groups addressing global problems. The desire for decentralized workplaces and a restrengthening of the family have resulted in new home-work patterns (with reduced commuting distances); there is a thriving new kind of cottage industry. Morale is high and there is a pervasive excitement about building the new society, using the Paidea image as a guide.

Citizen education is infused with new meaning. Whereas the citizen of 1970 had often felt impotent and depersonalized by the giant bureaucracies in business and Government, and alienated by the directions society was taking, the citizen of the transforming society feels exhilarated by the challenge of building the new society. He is learning with a purpose, and applying what is learned. Formal citizen education activities are adequately supported by society, but more importantly, there is a sense that in a constantly changing situation, all citizens are being educated all of the time.

Transforming Future: Citizen Education Opposing

The final scenario portrays citizen education, being essentially conservative, lagging behind and resisting the transformation to a post-modernizing society.

Citizen education is financially well supported but ineffective. It is ineffective mainly because it doesn't correspond to reality as the students perceive it. The emphasis on occupational preparation fills neither the perceived needs of the academically successful, who tend to be critical of "the system" and resist becoming "another computer entry," nor those of the academically unsuccessful, who sense they are being trained for jobs that won't be waiting for them when they get out. The citizen education curriculum pertains to a system that many of the students see as waning. They find more interest and value in real-life participation in "new society" activities they see all around them than in the kind of citizen participation they are being taught.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATION

At first glance, the final result of this excursion into the future may seem disappointing. It does not predict specifically which recommendations are likely to succeed and which are ill-conceived. Rather, it says that society may be in process of making a momentous choice — one of the most fateful in human history. Citizen education is but a small part of a larger pattern. It will tend to go as the overall pattern goes in the long run. To the extent that citizen education initiatives are in accord with the general direction of societal evolution, they will be supported and be successful; to the extent they oppose the overall thrust, they will be frustrated.*

*Focusing on Harman's concluding observations, Lee Anderson remarks: "It seems to me that the single most probable alternative future is one that Harman does not explicitly discuss. This is a future characterized by a rich and chaotic mixture of modern and post-modern elements. 'Our century,' as the Mexican poet Octavio Paz observes, is a huge cauldron in which all historical eras are boiling and mingling.' This is likely to be true of much, if not all, of the 21st century as well. If this is the case, then citizen education is occurring and will continue to occur within a societal context characterized by increasing complexity, chaos, tension, and uncertainty. Thus, the most probable future context of citizen education is one that does not fit neatly into either a model of an extrapolative future or a transformed future."

This conclusion should not be discouraging to those who aspire to contribute to a better world through citizen education. They may ask, in view of these powerful historical currents, "Can the individual make a difference?" Perhaps the best answer is, "individuals are the only ones who can." It has been said that nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come. Implicit in the arguments of the foregoing pages is an idea whose time may have come. It is individuals who will decide.*

This idea has no name yet. It is born of an observation that the consequences of growth along the long-term modernization trend are tending to be increasingly weighted toward the negative (see Table 2). The idea involves Langdon Winner's concept of "autonomous technology" 37/—"technics-out-of-control." Technology, once guided by social goals and values, has taken on a society-shaping momentum all its own. Winner speaks of "reverse adaptation"; instead of the means adapting to the ends, the autonomous technostucture with its inherent demands drives consumer preference, political decisions, and even primary social goals. Human values and goals adjust to match the character of available means.

*Kenneth Prewitt finds a contradiction here: "If futureology has proceeded without a theory of government, it has also failed to develop a convincing theory of social change which is alert to political dynamics. Harman, for instance, moves all the way from an approving citation of Braudel's conception of deep structures of historical transformation to the proposition that individual efficacy is the engine of social change."

Table 2
Summary of Arguments Why Long-Term
Modernization Trend Must Turn

The Long-Term Modernization Trend Has in the Past Brought:	BUT	Its Continuation in the Future Tends to Bring:
Material abundance		New forms of scarcity (e.g., of physical resources, of waste-absorbing capacity of the physical environment, of resilience of life-supporting ecosystems)
Problem-solving capabilities		Problem-generating tendencies (e.g., deteriorating environmental quality, chronic unemployment, decreasing satisfaction from institutionalized roles)
Unintended benefits (e.g., new technologies suggested by scientific advances)		Unintended negative consequences (e.g., threats to health from synthetic chemicals, disruption of natural balances)
Freeing of individuals (e.g., from economic want, natural disasters)		Enslaving of individuals (e.g., through dominance of large institutions, imposition of economic rationality on more and more aspects of life)
Support for democracy (e.g., by raised educational levels, supplying rationality for open decision-making)		Threats to democracy (e.g., by increasingly autonomous character of economic and technological institutions)

The idea also incorporates the observation of Fred Hirsch, in "Social Limits to Growth," 38/that the current belief in growth, and especially the concept that continuing growth will enable us to sidestep the distribution issue, is grounded in the false assumption that individual benefits add up. As he puts it so neatly, if one person stands on tiptoe, he gets a better view of the parade; if all stand on tiptoe, all are more uncomfortable but no one's view is improved.

In terms of the present discussion, these two insights might combine to postulate that the shaping theme of industrialized society is "autonomous modernization." This theme has led to the situation described by the late E. F. Schumacher in "A Guide for the Perplexed": "More and more people are beginning to realize that the 'modern experiment' has failed." 39/ The theme replacing "autonomous modernization," the idea whose time may have come, is the vision of a "post-modernizing" future outlined earlier.

The point is that when the idea's time really has come, the same sorts of individual actions which had once seemed so futile and puny in the face of the juggernaut-like momentum of institutions, habits, dogmas, and prejudices, suddenly begin to work together in new ways. The history of the civil rights movement furnishes an example. There was a time in the 1960's after which it was no longer socially tolerable in the United States to assert that blacks are inferior to whites. Not all racial problems were solved, of course, but after that point in time the problems became resolvable in a new way.

One indication that this idea's time may indeed have come is the crescendo of challenges to premises that were previously unchallenged, including:

1. It is inevitable and hence acceptable that the world should henceforth live in daily threat of nuclear holocaust (at best held at bay by some sort of agreement built on the shifting sands of international politics).

2. The present global maldistribution of wealth and opportunity is tolerable and justifiable.

3. Pursuit of technoeconomic system goals (e.g., economic growth, material progress, efficiency, productivity power) will lead to a humane future.

4. A viable future can be built on the current pattern of man "controlling" through technology and separating himself from the natural environment which brought him forth and sustains him.

5. The gradual degradation of the natural environment is a reasonable price to be paid for economic and technical progress.

6. It is inherent in the nature of modern society that individual and social activity, including the individual's relationship to society, should be structured as part of the money economy and evaluated in monetary terms.

7. There is no escaping the scientific demonstration that religious sensibilities, a valid spiritual basis for moral choices, and the human being's power to make free choices, are all merely figments of the imagination, and hence that Western man, traditionally endowed with reason, will, and a valid sense of value, is an exploded myth.

Citizen education implies the goal of participating effectively in the creation of a better society. Not better in terms of satisfying special desires of one interest group or another -- but better in the sense of more fully actualizing the values inherent in the Western political tradition out of which the Nation was created. These are values rooted in age-old transcendental experience, repeatedly validated through generations, and continually rediscovered in the human spiritual experience.*

The essence of my conclusions is that not only is this goal of participating in the creation of a better society meaningful in a new and even exhilarating sense, but furthermore, it may be an idea whose time has come.

*Prewitt argues that the Western political tradition is misinterpreted here: "Madison and his fellow founders were tutored by Locke and Hobbes, not by Rousseau. The Federalist papers explicitly use the Lockian tradition to construct a political order dedicated to the satisfaction of special interests." Prewitt suggests that when the Madisonian view is rejected, it must be replaced by an alternative view of government.

NOTES

1. Two useful summaries are: Edward Cornish, ed., "An Introduction to the Study of the Future, Part I," Washington, D.C.: World Future Society, 1977; and Wayne I. Boucher, ed., "The Study of the Future: An Agenda for Research," Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation report, No. NSF/RA 770036, 1977.
2. The latter include Herman Kahn, et al., "The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World," New York: William Morrow, 1973; and Daniel Bell, "The Coming of Post Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting," New York: Basic Books, 1973. For a contrasting, more pessimistic, scenario, see Robert Heilbroner, "An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect," New York: W. W. Norman, 1974.
3. Fernand Braudel, "The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II," New York: Harper and Row, 1976.
4. Robert Heilbroner, "The Great Ascent," New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
5. A good example of an exploration of alternative futures assuming no major break in the long-term trend will be found in Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener, "The Year 2000," New York: MacMillan Co., 1967.
6. Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics," Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.
7. Lewis Mumford, "The Transformations of Man," New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956.
8. One of the most perceptive analyses of the source of this resistance is Fred Hirsch, "Social Limits

to Growth," Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. A quite different analysis of the "consciousness" of the "demodernizing" movement will be found in Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, "The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness," New York: Vintage Books, 1973.

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10. E. F. Schumacher, "Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered," New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

David Dickson, "The Politics of Alternative Technology," New York: Universe Books, 1975.

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13. W. R. D. Sewell and H. D. Foster, "Images of Canadian Futures: The Role of Conservation and Renewable Energy." Office of the Science Adviser Report No. 13. Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1976.
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16. Barry Commoner, "The Closing Circle," New York: Knopf, 1971.
17. L. F. Stavrianos, "The Promise of the Coming Dark Age," San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975.

D. Yates, "Neighborhood Democracy: The Politics and Impacts of Decentralization," Boston: Lexington Books, 1973.
18. Richard Cornuelle, "De-Managing America: The Final Revolution," New York: Random House, 1975.
19. Jacob Needleman, "The New Religions," Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1970.
20. Mark Satin, "New Age Politics," Vancouver, B. C.: Fairweather Press, 1976.

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Lewis Mumford, "The Pentagon of Power," New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970.

Erich Fromm, "The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology," New York: Bantam Books, 1968.

Jules Henry, "Culture Against Man," New York: Vintage, 1963.

22. Daniel Yankelovich, "The New Morality: Profile of American Youth in the 70's," New York: McGraw Hill, 1974.
23. Peter Berger, "A Rumor of Angels," Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1969.
24. Jan Tinbergen, "Reshaping the International Order," Government of the Netherlands, 1976. Published in the U.S. by Dutton Co., New York.
25. "Towards a New International Order," A joint report issued under the auspices of the Governments of Algeria and the Netherlands, 1976, pp. 23-32.
26. Abraham Maslow, "Towards a Psychology of Being," 2nd ed. New York: Van Nostrand, 1968.
27. L. S. Stavrianos, "The Promise of the Coming Dark Age," San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976.
28. Louis Brandeis, "The Curse of Bigness," O. K. Fraenkel, ed. New York: Viking Press, 1934.
29. L. S. Stavrianos, op. cit., pp. 25-55.
30. Franz Fanon, "The Wretched of the Earth," New York: Grove Press, Inc.
31. Mark Satin, op. cit.
32. Virginia Hine, "The Basic Paradigm of a Future Socio-Cultural System," World Issues, April/May 1977, pp. 19-20.

33. "Over-education"--i.e., underemployment--is not such a new problem. Over a century and a half ago "Many businessmen questioned whether any education beyond the three 'Rs' was a good thing for potential industrial workers, whether it would not in the end make them discontented with doing only the menial tasks of industrial society." (Thomas Cochran and William Miller, "The Age of Enterprise," New York: Harper Brothers, 1942, p. 271.)
34. George Washington and Benjamin Franklin were both active and high-ranking Freemasons. Of the 56 signers of the Declaration of Independence, approximately 50 were Masons. All but five of the 55 members of the Constitutional Convention were Masons. Offshoots from the secret Masonic societies of Europe had transplanted to the New World 150 years before the Revolutionary War, and a conscious plan developed to found there the new order which would be so much more difficult to do in the established societies of Europe. Among those from other countries who supported the American Revolution many were Masons, including Lafayette, Kosciusko, Baron de Kalb, and Count Polaski. "Most of the patriots who achieved American independence belonged to these societies ... There can be no question that the great seal was directly inspired by those orders of the human Quest, and that it set forth the purpose for this Nation as that purpose was seen and known to the Founding Fathers." (Manly Hall, "The Secret Destiny of America," 3rd ed. Los Angeles: Philosophical Research Society, 1951, p. 181.
35. Robert Hutchins, "The Learning Society," New York: Praeger, 1968.
36. Werner Jaeger, "Paidea: The Ideals of Greek Culture," Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Oxford Press, 1945.

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38. Fred Hirsch, "Social Limits to Growth," Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.
39. E. F. Schumacher, "A Guide for the Perplexed," New York: Harper and Row, 1977.

APPENDIX A

Clement Bezold

The implications of Willis Harman's paper are in three areas:

1. Citizen education through political participation;
2. Citizen learning through citizen movements;
3. Citizen education in the schools.

CITIZEN EDUCATION THROUGH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political participation is often looked on as an outcome or indicator of citizen education. Here I reverse the role of political participation and look at its value as a means of citizen learning in light of Harman's larger analysis of alternative futures and the transformation.

Participation as a Learning Opportunity

Writers from Alexis de Tocqueville to Frantz Fanon have argued that the experience of participating in political activity can shape a new person, by socializing people into new beliefs, attitudes, and values. Through participation citizens develop a sense of "political efficacy" - the sense of capacity to effectively manipulate their relevant surroundings through political participation.^{1/} Efficacy -- the sense that one can make a difference -- is an important part of effective learning experiences.

John Dewey identified two characteristics of a learning experience and more recent educational writers have added others: (1) that the experience be immediately enjoyable; (2) that it lead to further learning experiences; and (3) that it take part in something worthwhile or important.^{2/}

Most conventional forms of participation (e.g., voting in candidate elections) are really not learning experiences when judged by these criteria. Certain forms of communal activity are, however, more effective in achieving educational purposes.

Forms and Patterns of Political Participation

In the best empirical study to date of participation modes in the United States, Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie used the following categories to identify activities aimed at influencing the Government:^{3/}

Campaign Activity

- persuading others how to vote
- actively working for party or candidate
- attending political meetings or rallies
- contributing money to party or candidate
- belonging to political clubs

Voting

- voting in presidential elections
- frequently voting in local elections

Cooperative or Communal Activity

- working with others on a local problem
- forming a group to work on local problems
- active membership in community problem-solving organizations

Personal Contacts With Officials

- contacting local officials
- contacting State and National officials

When Verba and Nie examined the results of their 1967 survey of more than 2,500 citizens and leaders in 64

communities, they found that 22 percent of citizens were not involved in politics in any way and the remainder could be divided into five participation categories: the complete activists (the 11 percent who work on community issues, voting and campaigning); the campaigners (the 15 percent who are heavily active in campaigns); the communalists (the 20 percent who either singly or with others attempt to deal with the more general problems of their communities or of their particular group); the parochial participants (the 4 percent whose activity is restricted to contacting public officials on matters that affect them only); and the voting specialists (the 21 percent who vote regularly and do nothing else).

The American voter has little knowledge of politics. The work of Nie and Verba¹ indicates that of the 55 percent of the population who vote with any regularity, only 26 percent (the campaigners and the complete activists) have a medium or high level of knowledge, while those who simply vote have low levels of information.

One explanation for this low level of political knowledge among American voters is the feeling that as citizens they can have little impact on what Government does:

Political attitude studies from the 1950's through the 1970's have shown that citizens express low levels of political interest and efficacy. Although Americans tend to express favorable general attitudes about political participation as an ideal, most feel that they are likely to have little or no effect on public policy decisions.⁴

Pollster Patrick Caddell commented that "when the voter no longer believes that voting has anything but random relation to outcome, he has no incentive to vote.⁵ One could add, nor to learn about the voting situation or its institutional context; i.e., which party is in power, who one's

Representative and Senators are, et cetera. Caddell estimates that only about 12 percent of the electorate felt that their participation in the electoral process had any effect.

How could the policymaking system be adjusted to allow citizens to take effective part in shaping the future? I shall examine three promising developments, namely, citizens' goals and future efforts by cities and States, technology assessment, and legislative foresight.

Three Government-initiated changes in the policymaking process at local, State, and National levels offer promise for more effective citizen education.

Goals and futures exercises: steps toward anticipatory democracy. Governments in more than 40 cities, States, and regions have developed programs to involve the public in setting goals and exploring the future of the area.^{6/}

These represent the steps toward developing what Alvin Toffler termed "anticipatory democracy"—decision-making that utilizes citizen participation in an attempt to create a more systematic awareness of the future and its many ramifications.

In the best of these programs, citizens have been given the opportunity first to invent their preferred futures for the area and then to identify the policies—and the attendant costs and implications—required to achieve these futures. Once an initial working group of citizens and experts has formulated the choices (in such policy areas as housing, education, transportation) inherent in these futures, the futures are then taken to a wider group of citizens to be reexamined and refined. The final set of choices is then disseminated through local newspapers; this dissemination is timed to coincide with television and other media programs whose purpose is to inform citizens of the trends, conditions, and opportunities underlying the choices in the various policy areas.

The entire population is then invited to participate in the project by responding to the newspaper survey or questionnaire, expressing their own preferred futures. Preliminary research indicates that where these programs have given citizens the opportunity to explore a range of possible futures, they have chosen a future which is in keeping with Harman's image of the transformational society.

The implications of these exercises for citizen education are extensive: citizens receive a sense of the major forces and problems in their area; they also begin to understand the workings of the policymaking process, and the requirements for change. All this is occurring as they shape the choices on the agenda and then register their preferences.

Thinking through the consequences. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the environmental movement joined with some of those involved in technological forecasting to question the previously unquestioned "technological imperative" -- the assumption that if an invention is technologically and economically possible, it should be done. A movement emerged calling for technological assessment -- the systematic consideration of the range of consequences likely to flow from a technology before it is put in place.

The fundamental argument for this position is the way in which technical decisions and their consequences are linked to the broad goals of society. The systematic consideration of consequences of alternative decisions cannot be separated from consideration of the societal goals toward which those consequences lead. Evaluation of consequences is inextricably linked to the ultimate political issues of preferred image of the future and means to actualize that future. Thus public participation is essential to technology assessment.

The growth of technology assessment is the growth of conscious efforts on the part of legislators to deal with the future more systematically in their policymaking.

The functions that legislative foresight activities perform include: (1) identifying emerging issues; (2) forecasting the impacts (primary and secondary) of legislation under consideration; (3) setting priorities and identifying the cross impacts of legislation from different committees; and (4) aiding in oversight of the implementation of legislative mandates.^{7/}

Citizen participation in foresight activities is essential if these activities are to be effective, particularly where legislatures move to anticipate an emerging issue which involves a high initial cost. For example, insufficient citizen awareness of the emerging energy problem made impossible the raising of energy prices in the late 1960's.

The implications of foresight activities for citizen education are threefold. First, an understanding of how legislatures operate from the foresight perspective is more important than a knowledge of the name of the speaker of the House, or which party holds the majority.

The second implication grows out of the first and resembles the implication of technology assessment—that is, description and analysis are easier where they are related to evaluation in terms of the personal goals or standards of the individual. Thus, citizens need to be able to place individual decisions and the foresight activity around them in the larger context of their preferred future.

The third implication for citizen education is the need for citizens to make foresight one of the things they demand from their elected officials.

Beyond the goals and futures exercises, technology assessment, and legislative foresight, there are other examples of Government-initiated developments which provide opportunities for citizen education through participation in policymaking. The increasing number of mandates for public participation in Federal programs is one of these.^{8/}

CITIZEN LEARNING THROUGH CITIZEN MOVEMENTS

While governments have concerned themselves with improving the planning mechanisms from the top, citizens' groups have mobilized from the bottom.

In the Verba and Nie survey, the 20 percent who were communalists did not vote as frequently as many others. Yet the communalists were higher in their civic orientation, in their concern for politics, in their levels of information, and in their feelings of efficacy -- than any group except the complete activists.

What the analysis by Nie and Verba missed was the emergence since the early 1960's of a variety of citizen movements. These movements have provided the major impetus for identifying the problems associated with the modernization/industrialization trends cited in Harman's paper; they include citizens' movements working for:

- enfranchisement of the poor
- the elimination of racism
- self-determination of youth and the elderly
- consumer protection
- women's rights
- environmental protection
- local self-reliance
- neighborhood revitalization
- economic democracy
- appropriate technology
- energy conservation
- holistic health
- global justice

As Harman noted, these movements form networks "composed of autonomous segments which are organizationally self-sufficient, any of which could survive the elimination of all the others...this is precisely the sort of pattern consistent with a vision of 'the global village', 'debureaucratization', 'decentralization', and 'rehumanization'.9/

Participants in these movements are alienated with one or more aspects of the dominant perception of reality and take it on themselves to act. As Hazel Henderson has put it:

While the commercial media have projected images of split-level suburban lifestyles conducive to satisfying the needs of a mass-consumption society, citizens' movements, whether for peace, consumer and environmental protection, or social equality, have focused on the unpublicized, the unresearched, and often suppressed information that constitutes the other side of the coin of industrial and technological development.10/

Participants in these movements are in effect setting the "systematic agenda"; in some cases they are pushing their issues onto the "institutional agendas" of their local, State, and national governments for active consideration by policymakers."11/

These new citizens' movements are a major resource for citizen education for the transformation. Individually, they often are not aware of the large picture of change going on around them - they feel and respond to the particular problem facing them. The image of the future which appears to underlie many of these efforts is summarized in the Harman paper. From this emerges a notion of citizen education which mirrors the Greek notion of Paidea—where all institutions were designed to develop all of their members to their highest powers.

Government can provide greater opportunity for citizen education by adjusting the policymaking process, but citizens' movements have often shown governments to be impotent in certain areas (energy, civil rights, etc.) until a critical mass of public awareness and activism is developed. As governments allow citizens to more consciously choose the future they prefer, they must take into account the self-reliant forms of citizen activity which many of the transformation groups represent.

Many of the older voluntary organizations began as responses to problems that were not otherwise being met. After becoming institutionalized and bureaucratized, they, in fact, became part of the problem. This has led to a situation in which many of the older established voluntary organizations complain of a loss in volunteers,^{12/} despite other evidence that the voluntary sector is healthier than ever.

While a number of forces are at work, including the entry of growing numbers of women into the job market, volunteers are "voting with their feet" for activities which they consider to be socially important and for organizations they consider to be vital and enthusiastic. Older groups should use new citizens' movements as a benchmark of changes taking place in society and develop "renewal processes." The newly emerging groups need to ensure that they continue to be consistent with the emerging image of the future that is inherent in the transformation.

Some of the new citizens' groups, particularly public interest groups, have already become locked into outdated adversarial processes and developed a shrillness of style and a belief in their righteousness over the "enemy." Thus while they act as a countervailing power, they have not yet developed the higher standards of advocacy that will be necessary to avoid the failures of current policymaking processes.

CITIZEN EDUCATION IN SCHOOL

Discussion of the most appropriate approaches to citizen education in the schools is ongoing and lively.^{13/} The major approaches fall roughly into three categories:^{14/}

1. Those that are content focused: they include academic disciplines, particularly social studies and history, law-related education, and social problems courses;
2. Those that teach citizenship skills through personal or classroom techniques: these techniques include critical thinking, political decisionmaking, values clarification, moral development, and thinking about "preferred worlds" or "alternative futures";
3. Those that teach citizenship skills through participation in actual decisionmaking or other related activities, such as institutional reform, community volunteer service, internships, participation in citizens' movements on communal (including global) issues, etc.

Harman's analysis, and new directions in policymaking suggest several possibilities for each of these school-based approaches. Content-focused programs should devote attention to the basic underlying forces of trends toward modernization and their countertrends. Citizens' movements and related forms of communal participation should be examined in light of their contributions toward developing an image of the future. Information about policymaking in government should help elucidate emerging issues and alternative futures through attention to technology assessment and legislative foresight mechanisms.

As students develop decisionmaking skills, they should be made aware of the consequence of their decisions for their preferred images of the future. Moreover, participation programs should provide students with opportunities for involvement in activities which aim at overcoming the problems in the policymaking process—activities such as

goals and futures exercises, technology assessment, and legislative foresight. Studies on the goals and futures exercises show the need for research and other support which students may be able to provide.

Where students work with citizens' groups or take part in communal activity, the relation to the futures of the community should be considered. The role of citizens' groups in putting new issues on the community's agenda, and their readiness to explore and be responsible for the consequences of their actions are all important topics students should explore.

CONCLUSION

I have examined the opportunities for citizen education through participation in policymaking processes, citizen movements, and the schools. The analysis was premised on the notion that a key aspect of learning is a sense of efficacy—the feeling that one can shape one's environment. It assumes that a transformation is taking place as society seeks to overcome the problems it created for itself in the process of modernization and industrialization. But whether or not the transformation is taking place, real gains in citizen education will come only as opportunities emerge for citizens to consciously shape society toward their preferred future. Citizen education will be effective only when citizens know what future they prefer, and accept responsibility for bringing it about.

NOTES

1. Terrence E. Cook and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. "An Introduction to Participatory Democracy," San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1971, p. 7.
2. Dan Conrad and Diane Hedin, "Citizenship Education Through Participation," in "Education for Responsible Citizenship," Report of the National Task Force on Citizenship Education, New York: McGraw Hill, 1977.
3. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, "Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality," New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p. 58.
4. "Citizen Education Today," p. 62, citing Louis Harris, "The Anguish of Change," p. 101.
5. Patrick Caddell and Albert C. Pierce, "Alienation and Politics: What is the Electorate Telling Us?" in Jonathan Moore and Albert C. Pierce, eds. "Voters, Primaries and Parties," Cambridge: Kennedy Institute of Politics, Harvard University, 1976, p. 24. This led Caddell to the speculation that only 12 percent of the electorate (34 percent of the 37 percent who voted) are confident in the basic efficacy of the political process. Nie and Verba's analysis would suggest that the communal participants (about 20 percent) would support the basic efficacy of the system except for elections.
6. Alvin Toffler, "Future Shock," New York: Bantam, 1970, and "What is Anticipatory Democracy?" The Futurist, April 1976, p. 105. The goals and futures groups are reviewed in David E. Baker, "State, Regional and Local Experiments in Anticipatory Democracy: An Overview"; Newt Gingrich, "Goals for Georgia"; Robert Bradley, "Goals for Dallas"; and Robert Stilger, "Alternatives for Washington" in Clement Bezold, ed., "Anticipatory

Democracy: The People in the Politics of the Future," New York: Random House, forthcoming Fall 1978.

7. Clement Bezold and William L. Renfro, "Citizens and Legislative Foresight," in Clement Bezold, ed., "Anticipatory Democracy."
8. See Community Services Administration, "Citizen Participation," San Jose, Calif: Rapido Press, 1978.
9. Virginia Hine, "The Basic Paradigm of a Future Socio-Cultural System," World Issues, April/May 1977, pp. 19-20.
10. Hazel Henderson, "Citizen Movements Charting Alternative Futures," in Clement Bezold, ed., "Anticipatory Democracy."
11. Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, "Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building," Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972. Some of the organizations putting issues within the transformation on the institutional agendas of State, local and Federal governments are listed in Clement Bezold, "The Future of Government: Trends and Emerging Conditions," in Sylvia Faibisoff and George S. Bonn, Changing Times: Changing Libraries," Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978.
12. Gordon Manser and Rosemary Higgins Cass, "Voluntarism at the Crossroads," 1976.
13. The principal writings used in this review of the status of citizen education in schools are: "Education for Responsible Citizenship," Report of the National Task Force on Citizenship Education, New York: McGraw Hill, 1977, particularly, Dan Conrad and Diane Hedin, "Citizen Education

Through Participation," pp. 135-156; Howard D. Mehlinger, "The Crisis in Civic Education," pp. 69-82; Fred M. Newmann, "Alternative Approaches to Citizenship Education: A Search for Authenticity," pp. 175-187; and Saul H. Medlovitz, Lawrence Metcalf, and Michael Washburn, "The Crisis of Global Transformation, Interdependence and the Schools," pp. 189-212; James P. Shaver, ed., "Building Rationales for Citizen Education," Bulletin 52, National Council for the Social Studies; Dana G. Kurfman, ed., "Developing Decisionmaking Skills," Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1977; Richard C. Remy, "Making, Judging and Influencing Political Decisions: A Focus for Citizen Education," *Social Education*, October 1976, pp. 360-365; James John Jelinek, ed., "Improving the Human Condition: A Curricular Response to Critical Realities," Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1978; and Harold G. Shane, "Curriculum Change Toward the 21st Century," Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1977.

14. Combined from Fred M. Newmann, "Alternative Approaches to Citizenship Education"; Dan Conrad and Diane Hedin, "Citizen Education Through Participation"; Saul H. Mendlovitz, Lawrence Metcalf, and Michael Washburn, "The Crisis of Global Transformation, Interdependence and the Schools"; and Richard C. Remy, "Making, Judging and Influencing Political Decisions: A Focus for Citizen Education."

APPENDIX B

Lee F. Anderson

Dr. Harman's paper is among the best essays on citizen education that I have read. Its special merit is that Harman begins to focus on a set of analytical issues that should be, but seldom are, at the center of our thinking about citizen education.

As my comments will indicate, I do not feel that Harman always sharply defines these issues nor does he provide a comprehensive analysis of them. But these are inevitable defects in any innovative and pioneering argument. My point is that Harman indicates the directions in which serious inquiry into the problem of citizen education should be heading. I will thus briefly discuss some important issues I see raised by Harman's essay. These deserve serious and continuing attention by those individuals and organizations with an interest in citizen education.

The first of these issues is captured by Harman's question "What really is the problem of citizen education?" Harman's discussion of this issue is very much on target. Given the centrality of this matter, this issue warrants substantially more analysis than Harman is able to provide within a short and multipurpose paper. Here is a short inventory of issues that appear to be at the heart of any effort to fashion a comprehensive definition of the problem education.

1. What is the character of the problems and difficulties individual citizens encounter in relating to the "culture of modernized societies"? E.g., problems and difficulties in relating to: particular institutions and generic types of organizational forms; technologies and technological systems; linguistic forms such as the specialized languages of law, medicine, technology; dominant systems of perceptions and belief.

2. Who experiences these problems and difficulties most intensely? When in the life cycle are they particularly salient? In what social roles (e.g., worker, consumer, client, constituent, etc.) are different problems and difficulties particularly acute?

3. In what ways and to what extent does the origin or source of the problems and difficulties of citizenship lie outside the educational system? In what ways and to what extent are they traceable to generic characteristics of modernized societies in contrast to pre-modern? To modern capitalist in contrast to modern socialist societies? To elements of culture and social structure unique to American society?

A careful and thorough analysis of these types of questions would, I think, lead to a much more comprehensive definition of the problem of citizen education than currently exists. In the end, Harman's general conclusion might well emerge: "The characteristics of advanced industrial society make extraordinarily difficult the carrying out of the tasks of citizen education." But in the process of reaching this conclusion a much more detailed conceptual and empirical map of the problem of citizen education would have been constructed than is currently available. Such a map would have several values including the clarification of some important logical choices which, in turn, have significant policy implications. Let me cite a few examples.

In Harman's current discussion of the tasks of citizen education, the two classes of objectives, "preparing for effective citizenship" and "the enfranchisement of citizens," are treated as if they occupy identical positions in logical space; i.e., they are two sub-sets of a single set. This is, of course, not the case, as a careful reading of Harman's subsequent analysis reveals. The set of tasks relating to citizen enfranchisement emerges only because the first set of tasks is in fact impossible to achieve within the existing societal content.

By conceptually disentangling the two sets one is forced to confront directly several assumptions implicit in Harman's analysis. One is the assumption that the first set of goals of citizen education is, in fact, of continuing historical worth. Like Harman, I personally feel that they are; but the counter argument needs careful consideration, namely, modernization has rendered our traditional conceptions of citizenship obsolete. In this case, the problem of citizen education is a problem of evolving new and different conceptions of the task of citizen education.

Another kind of assumption implicit in Harman's analysis is that education must somehow be relevant to the problems and difficulties of citizenship in modernized societies. This may in fact not be the case at all. It may be that the powerlessness, the alienation, the impersonality, the absence of skills, and the cognitive deprivations as well as other maladies which citizens appear to suffer in modern societies have their origin outside of the educational system and hence are not susceptible to alleviation through new and better citizen education of any form or variety.

In this case the problem of citizen education lies in the fact that citizens confront problems and difficulties for which educators have no solution. In short, there may be severe limits to education even when education is conceived to be much broader than schooling. Indeed, such a view would seem to be implicit in the conclusion of Harman's own analysis. This would not be good news for the civic education enterprise at a time when it is struggling to keep its head above the water, but a carefully formulated "limits of education" argument is needed.

A second type of issue raised by Harman's essay that deserves substantially more discussion concerns the interrelationship of societal context, citizenship, and education for citizenship. It is undoubtedly the case that a substantial change in societal context alters the nature of citizenship. But what about education for citizenship? Is citizen education for an extrapolative future fundamentally different from citizen education for a transformed future?

I feel there is some ambiguity in Harman's discussion of this matter. At times Harman seems to argue that movement into a postmodern future will simply revitalize existing types of educational programs, and at other times Harman seems to argue that the emergence of a post-modern world calls for a new and different type of citizen education. This may be an unfair or inaccurate criticism of Harman's argument; but even so, there is nevertheless a need for a more systematic treatment of the implications of alternative futures for the design and development of programs in citizen education. Do, in fact, alternative futures imply basically different citizen education programs? If so, what precisely are these differences?

This reference to alternative futures points to a third type of issue raised by the Harman paper. It seems to me that the single most probable alternative future is one that Harman does not explicitly discuss. This is a future characterized by a rich and chaotic mixture of modern and post-modern elements. "Our century," as the Mexican poet Octavio Paz observes, "is a huge cauldron in which all historical eras are boiling and mingling." This is likely to be true of much, if not all, of the 21st century as well. If this is the case, then citizen education is occurring and will continue to occur within a societal context characterized by increasing complexity, chaos, tension, and uncertainty. Thus, the most probable future context of citizen education is one that does not fit neatly into either a model of an extrapolative future or a transformed future.

Ronald D. Brunner

In his difficult but insightful paper on "Citizen Education and the Future," Professor Harman provides a futures perspective on citizen education policy. The study, in his words, ". . . does not predict specifically which recommendations are likely to succeed and which are ill-conceived. Rather, it says that society may be in process of making a momentous choice — one of the most fateful in human history." The choice is between an extrapolative future of continued modernization and a transformed future that is in part a reaction to the basic trend.

Let me grant that the extrapolative future and the transformed future are useful constructs for clarifying where we might be going with respect to where we have already been. The issue is what role these two futures should play in citizen education policy, and whether they are meaningful alternatives for choice.

Through most of the study, the extrapolative and transformed futures are construed as societal determinants of the feasibility and effectiveness of citizen education policies. Thus, ". . . citizen education is but a small part of a larger (societal) pattern. It will tend to go as the overall pattern goes in the long run." Professor Harman defines the "stances" for citizen education as "going (along) with" or "opposing" whichever future is eventually realized. Neither future is clearly deemed more probable than the other, and neither stance is chosen as preferable to the other. Perhaps choice would make little difference under these deterministic assumptions.

Toward the conclusion of the study, the vision of a post-modernizing future is tentatively and indirectly selected as the goal of individual action and citizen education policy. Nothing is so powerful as an idea whose time has come. Replacing "autonomous modernization" is the vision

of a post-modernizing future, "the idea whose time may have come." Under these circumstances, individuals will determine the future. Long-term modernization is said to have increasingly negative consequences, and the post-modernizing future is implicitly identified with a better society. As Harman puts it: "The essence of our conclusions here is that not only is this goal of participating in the creation of a better society meaningful in a new and exhilarating sense, but furthermore, the situation in citizen education may be propitious for an idea whose time has come."

In my view, neither of the two futures should be taken as a societal determinant of citizen education policy nor should the post-modernizing vision be taken as the goal of citizen education policy. These futures and this vision should play the much more modest role of data on the ideological tendencies of the current era, to be included along with other data in curriculums and the media of mass communication.

The traditional goal of citizen education in a democratic society is to enhance the ability and the opportunity of every citizen to think independently and effectively, and to act on the result in the face of inevitable uncertainty. This goal is consistent with the hominocentric principle that human beings are ends, not means subservient to the interests of the state or social forces. This goal is also consistent with the democratic principle that an able and enlightened citizenry tends not only to preserve human rights, but also to minimize the human costs of social change through the evolution of ideas of potential value to society and the implementation of those that are constructive.

Denying the significance of individual choice in the face of social forces shaping the future tends to undermine the traditional goal of citizen education and to deny the experience on which it is grounded. Replacing the traditional goal with a grand vision of past or future tends to

undermine enduring procedures for evolving answers and to foster faith in the answer. Grand visions tend to become obsolete as effective guides to thought and action as events unfold, but nevertheless tend to survive as dogma.

Grand visions serve political and emotional functions. Elites discover that a high level of abstraction adapted to the emotional needs of a population diverts attention from diverse interests and increases or sustains solidarity. Ordinary citizens discover at an unconscious or pre-conscious level that a grand vision can relieve the symptoms of personal insecurity in a complex world. In these respects, the modernizing vision and the post-modernizing vision are similar. When such functions are understood, the content and distribution of grand visions can be turned into data and, with appropriate intellectual tools, used to shed considerable light on social problems and constructive ways of dealing with their cause.

The primary task of citizen education is not to foster ideological debate and analysis among elites who thrive on grand visions.

The task is to implement the traditional goal by encouraging the dissemination of the data and the intellectual tools and procedures that the individual citizen can use to formulate his or her own answers to specific problems. Such tools and procedures exist and tend to be rediscovered in approximately equivalent forms. They share certain formal propensities as well as respect for the intellectual autonomy and potential of the individual.

Kenneth Prewitt

Very few futureologists are political scientists. Perhaps this accounts for the sparse treatment of politics in their scenarios, especially those scenarios which depict a radically transformed future. It is also true of scenarios which view the future as an extrapolation of the present.

The political sociologist Daniel Bell, for example, provides little insight into the types of political order to expect in his post-industrial society, though he does provide the concept of circulation of elites, which will accompany the skill revolution going on in advanced industrial societies.¹ Whatever one thinks of Bell's sociology of occupational change, his political science is little more than the assertion that politics will still matter in the post-industrial society.

There is, to be sure, discussion of the political issues of the future. But this animated discussion is not matched with the hard thinking that would tell us what kind of political order to expect. What decision-rules will guide the policy process of the future? What new institutions of government will be fashioned?

Harman's essay further illustrates the undeveloped political science of future scenarios. He writes in concluding the essay:

Citizen education implies the goal of participating effectively in the creation of a better society. Not better in terms of satisfying special desires of one interest group or another—but better in the sense of more fully actualizing the values inherent in the Western political tradition out of which the Nation was created.

The context makes clear that the Nation is the United States. Harman has clearly misread the Western political tradition. Madison and his fellow founders were tutored by Locke and Hobbes, not by Rousseau. The Federalist Papers explicitly use the Lockian tradition to construct a political order dedicated to the satisfaction of special interests. "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition," wrote Madison. The causes of faction are sown into the nature of men, especially their unequal faculties for acquiring property. Citizens enter the social contract in order to protect property and the right to accumulate. To be sure, the Constitution insists upon equality. But it is a special form of equality. Because each individual best understands his or her own self-interest, equal political power (the vote) is necessary to protect and promote that self-interest. It is not accidental that the vote — the basic act of political citizenship — is secret and individualistic rather than open and communal. To each individual is granted the equal right to pursue a self-interested vision.²

Madison and colleagues accepted the inevitability of social conflict. Democracy, for them, was a method of conflict management in which various interests would be heard and represented. Our Western political tradition as translated through the Constitution assumes and legitimates the self-interested acquisition of material benefits. Competing claims for a fair share of the "American way of life" — from Jacksonians to today's minority — have been fought on the turf of the Constitution. Constitutional interpretations and re-interpretations have been the means for allocating benefits from one special interest to another.

I do not remind us of the message of the Federalist Papers simply to take a cheap shot at a particular sentence in Harman's paper, a sentence which easily could be edited to escape criticism. My purpose is broader. The conception

of citizenship in the Federalist Papers is informed by a theory of government. One may accept or reject this theory, with its pessimism about the self-interested nature of mankind and its optimism about the ability of institutions to manage the resulting conflict in a just manner. But there is a political context for the conception of citizenship and therefore a basis for talking about alternative modes of citizenship education. I search for the theory of government which would inform either the extrapolated or the transformed futures described by Harman, and I find only code words such as "decentralization" and "participatory democracy," whose shortcomings I note here.

If futureology has proceeded without a theory of government, it has also failed to develop a convincing theory of social change which is alert to political dynamics. Harman, for instance, moves all the way from an approving citation of Braudel's conception of deep structures of historical transformation to the proposition that individual efficacy is the engine of social change. It takes a nimble mind to stretch from Braudel to the unequivocal assertion that "it is individuals who will decide" what the future holds.

Suppose Harman is correct. Suppose that the social transformation of which he writes will be brought about by acts of the individual will. What kind of acts are called for? In the language of the essay, what kind of a citizenship is demanded? In the answer to this question, is the clue to the political theory of social change adopted by futureologists. The answer does not bode well for citizenship.

It seems that the most efficacious thing the citizen can do is withdraw consent from the institutions of society, to de-legitimate those institutions. Set aside what this means for society and inquire only into what it implies for citizenship. Albert Hirschman's language is useful.³ Harman is asking the citizen to "exit" from society without

actually leaving it. This is an ambiguous role at best, a profound alienation at worst. If a citizen literally exits, joining a self-sufficient commune or emigrating, he or she has taken a stand. But citizens who withdraw yet stay around can only be in a very ambiguous relationship with institutions that continue to feed, to transport, to entertain, to house, and to educate them. The "withdrawing but remaining" citizens adopt a posture of distrust and dislike toward institutions on which they remain dependent. Perhaps this is the appropriate stance of the citizen who would bring about needed social changes. If so, it cannot be a healthy chapter in the history of citizenship.

Withdrawal of consent not only strips citizens of meaningful exit, it strips them of voice. Voice is speaking out, challenging, voting, assembling, petitioning, fighting back. Voice is the material of citizenship in the Western political tradition. I do not see that the citizen can seriously withdraw consent and yet employ voice. The act of voting is to grant legitimacy to the electoral process. Joining the consumer movement is to accept that interest group conflicts will be worked out in the legislative arena. To file a class action suit is of course to recognize the authority of the court. Even the anti-nuclear petition takes on meaning only if it is delivered to someone in authority.

I am not sure whether to take "withdrawal of consent" seriously. If I do, then I can only observe that traditional concepts of citizenship, including exit, voice, and loyalty, will suffer severely. And I do not see that those advocating withdrawal have worked through the full implications. Certainly based upon what is known about political socialization, it will take generations to bring about full-fledged withdrawal of consent and then additional generations to repair the damage by creating new traditions and forms of citizenship.

But perhaps withdrawal of consent should not be taken so seriously. Then I fail to see what does constitute a political theory of social change for the futureologists.

It is time to put the difficulty of Harman's essay into focus. To talk meaningfully about citizenship education requires a conception of citizenship. But citizenship is not a free-floating concept. It is an element in one's conception of governance and the state. And, of course, an accurate and adequate theory of government must in turn be based on an understanding of the social and economic order of the society being governed. Futureologists frequently deal imaginatively with alternative visions of the economic and social order. Certainly Harman's treatment is creative and instructive.

But then he tries to get all the way back to citizenship education without giving much attention to the kind of political order which will accompany future economic and social orders. It won't work. Citizenship, let alone citizenship education, cannot be lifted out of the political context. The authors of the Federalist Papers recognized this, as have political theorists before and since. I make a small plea for more political theory in writings which describe future societies.^{4/} Then we can turn to the complex questions of citizenship education.

In conclusion, I turn briefly to what Harman does, and does not say about citizenship in his alternative futures. Take first the transformed future. Much of what Harman describes as citizenship, though attractive to contemplate, is obviously and excessively romanticized. What strikes Harman as difficult is the transformation of the society, not the form of citizenship which should and would occur.

Unfortunately, citizenship in decentralized, small, face-to-face political units has not fared well. Though limited, the research points in one direction.^{5/} Unless there is enforced consensus by tightly restricting membership, the communal democracies have a difficult time containing political conflicts without resorting to those same institu-

tional arrangements -- division of political labor, representation, decision-rules -- which characterize the larger society.

Moreover, smallness can be suffocating. It is not easy to avoid the tyranny of the majority, which of course is one reason why Madison, in Federalist No. 10, defended a large republic in the first place. Although it is far too early to slip into pessimism about the effects on citizenship of small decision units and radical participatory democracies, certainly the evidence does not warrant such romantic images as Harman puts before us. Much hard work -- empirical and experimental, as well as theoretical -- will be necessary before a citizenship education program can be fashioned which would equip people for meaningful participation in a decentralized political order.

Matters are not simpler if we turn from the transformed to the extrapolated future. And because Harman cannot promise us the social transformation, we have some obligation to consider citizenship against the possibility that the future is simply going to be more of the present. Harman himself does not help us meet this obligation. For him the picture of citizenship in the extrapolated future is bleak, unless of course the citizen is in revolt against the institutions of society. Citizenship will be salvaged if at all by politics of de-legitimation. Which is to say that citizenship can be meaningful only if it ushers in the social transformation.

But those responsible for citizenship education planning will have to escape this closed circle. Some effort should be made to construct a meaningful citizen role even in the extrapolated future.

How might citizens accommodate themselves to the increasing specialization of politics? What criteria, humanistic as well as rationalistic, might be used to select among competing policies in the provider state? Can the government be used to bring to account non-state actors, such as the scientific and technological communities, without itself becoming unaccountable?

Though not the questions Harman chose to wrestle with, these will be questions at the heart of citizen education debates, should the future not succumb to the countertrends so eloquently and persuasively outlined in his paper.

NOTES

1. Daniel Bell, "The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society," New York: Basic Books, 1973.
2. This idea is developed by Jane Mansbridge in her unpublished manuscript, "Radical Democracy."
3. Albert Hirschman, "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty," Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.
4. Heinz Eulau has begun this task, not for citizenship concepts but for the recruitment and exercise of leadership. See his "Technology and Civility," especially "Skill Revolution and Consultative Commonwealth." Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977.
5. See, for example, Mansbridge, "Radical Democracy"; and, especially, Grant McConnell, "Private Power and American Democracy," New York: Knopf, 1966.

Betty Reardon

Dr. Harman's paper represents a comprehensive and basically humanistic approach to citizen education from a futuristic perspective. Although his analysis is valid, it is that of a minority of the human family, indeed, the most powerful minority, but one which has been legitimately criticized for failure to consider more fully the needs, values, and views of the vast majority of the earth's population. While he appears to support the trends toward liberation and participation, the primary concerns and issues are not those which would be identified by those most in need of liberation -- the colonized, the poor, ethnic minorities, and women; rather, they reflect the perceptions of the global elites. Granted, he is part of a humanistic, dissenting elite; however, he speaks from the vantage point of the technologically advanced, Euro-urban, male-oriented society.

And he excludes several significant viewpoints. Dr. Harman's references list but two women, no contemporary "Third World" scholars (I don't consider Fanon "contemporary"), and no liberation movement activists. Certainly feminist futurists such as Elise Boulding and Hazel Henderson have had much to say about future choice making and public policy. Their ideas could be extremely useful in interpreting trends and proposing interventions for effective citizenship education.

Third World thinkers could contribute another vital aspect to future thinking. The futures projected by Rajni Kothari of the University of Delhi and Ali Mazrui, the noted African scholar, in the publication series of the World Order Models project, call for transformations which demand significant, probably painful changes on the part of the American citizenry. The works of economist Sami Amin and the futurists Carlos Mallmann, Elinora Masini, and Johan Galtung, all of whom work primarily from a global analysis

with a concern for the equity and justice demanded by the Third World, could broaden our view and lead us closer to the perspectives of global citizenship as well as the humane concerns Harman seems to favor. Although not futurist, the works of Freire and Nyerere could give insights into the specific nature of the educational tasks.³

Even those Third World people within the United States, I believe, would find the paper lacking in sensitivity to their concerns. Do not the actions and reflections of activists such as Fannie Lou Hamer, Martin Luther King, Cesar Chavez and Russell Means tell us something about the imperatives and tactics of the politics of transition as well as the transformed society? We must begin to work for more clarity on the two crucial questions about the future of the United States that have been so sharply articulated by the Civil Rights movement: what kind of a society do we want and what means are we going to use to achieve it? Without some consensus on those issues (without dealing directly with the trends and countertrends Harman describes so well), we cannot hope to plan effective citizenship education.

I have a very strong hunch that the responses to those questions from an urban black, a single mother, and a Chicano farm worker, while agreeing with the norms reflected in the paper, would put forth a different concrete vision, perhaps one still very concerned with "deficiency needs," and would, therefore, list different issues and problems to be overcome to achieve a more desirable future. My hunch is, too, that their visions might be somewhat compatible with those of the oppressed in the developing countries.

How might we state the issues and problems if the perspectives of the "disenfranchized" with whom Dr. Harman obviously is concerned were to be given their just weight in the analysis, and what questions does that raise for citizenship education? While I don't reject those raised in

the paper, I do urge that the list be augmented with a clear statement of justice and survival issues. In the former area the problems of racism, sexism, and colonialism must be included; in the latter, the possibilities of eco-catastrophe, nuclear holocaust, and mass starvation. Citizenship education for a better future must deal in the present with hunger and poverty, repression and discrimination, militarism and violence. These trends in our society are equally as significant as technology, centralization, and alienation.

The central questions for citizenship education for the United States are: (1) How will we in the near future apply equally to all Americans the values articulated in the Declaration of Independence; and (2) how will this country adjust to a future in which our global hegemony gives way to a just participatory role in a world system based on equity?

NOTES

1. The perspectives and concerns of both of these women are briefly stated in the Fall 1975 issue of the Earthrise Newsletter.
2. The World Order Models Project Series is published by the Institute for World Order, 1140 Avenue of the Americas, New York.
3. Especially "Pedagogy of the Oppressed" by Freire and "Education for Liberation."